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作者：Nasser, Sherif; Turcic, Danko
作者单位：Cornell University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：This paper analyzes a setting in which a manufacturer (he) and a retailer (she) face uncertain demand, but the retailer has an information advantage in the form of a private demand forecast. Such information asymmetry causes the manufacturer to incur a hidden information cost. The results show that a manufacturer can leverage his timing advantage to strategically implement a temporary contract adjustment (TCA) mechanism, which allows him to counter his informational disadvantage and either eli...
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作者：Morck, Randall; Yavuz, M. Deniz; Yeung, Bernard
作者单位：University of Alberta; National Bureau of Economic Research; Purdue University System; Purdue University; National University of Singapore
摘要：Within countries, individual state-run banks' lending correlates with prior money growth; similar private-sector banks' lending does not. Aggregate credit and investment growth correlate with prior money growth more where banking systems are more state-run. Size and liquidity differences between state-run and private-sector banks do not drive these results; further tests discount broad classes of alternative explanations. Tests exploiting heterogeneity in political pressure on state-run banks ...
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作者：Eisert, Tim; Eufinger, Christian
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：This paper explains why banks derive a benefit from being highly interconnected. We show that when banks are protected by government guarantees, they can significantly increase their expected returns by channeling funds through the interbank market before these funds are invested in real assets. If banks that are protected by implicit or explicit government guarantees act as intermediaries between other banks and real investments, there is the possibility that these intermediary banks will be ...
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作者：Delage, Erick; Kuhn, Daniel; Wiesemann, Wolfram
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Imperial College London
摘要：Stochastic programming and distributionally robust optimization seek deterministic decisions that optimize a risk measure, possibly in view of the most adverse distribution in an ambiguity set. We investigate under which circumstances such deterministic decisions are strictly outperformed by random decisions, which depend on a randomization device producing uniformly distributed samples that are independent of all uncertain factors affecting the decision problem. We find that, in the absence o...
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作者：Gallani, Susanna; Krishnan, Ranjani; Marinich, Eric J.; Shields, Michael D.
作者单位：Harvard University; Michigan State University; University System of Ohio; Miami University
摘要：This study examines the effect of psychological contract breach on budgetary misreporting. Psychological contracts are mental models or schemas that govern how employees understand their exchange relationships with their employers. Psychological contract breach leads to feelings of violation and can occur even when employees' economic contracts are fulfilled. We study the effects of psychological contract breach on three common types of employee participation in budgeting that differ in the de...
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作者：Glazer, Jacob; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Warwick; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：A problem solver (PS) is an agent who when interacting with other agents does not put himself in their shoes but rather chooses a best response to a uniform distribution over all possible configurations consistent with the information he receives about the other agents' moves. We demonstrate the special features of a PS by analyzing a modified coordination game. In the first stage, each of the other participants-who are treated as conventional players-chooses a location. The PS then receives s...
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作者：Green, Etan A.; Rao, Justin M.; Rothschild, David
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Microsoft
摘要：To what extent does expertise depend on context? We observe professionals perform a task that is logically isomorphic to-but contextually distinct from-a familiar task in which they are skilled. We find that performance plummets when contextual cues disappear, suggesting that the expertise we observe on the familiar task is more heuristic than conceptual and does not travel far.
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作者：David, Alexander; Lehar, Alfred
作者单位：University of Calgary
摘要：Interbank financial networks enable banks to share the risks in their assets but potentially also increase systemic spillovers of insolvency from one bank to others in the network. We model a renegotiation game to explicitly examine the forgiveness of commitments of insolvent banks by solvent banks to limit the systemic transmission of financial distress. The assets of the insolvent bank can be appropriated by the forgiving bank in the two-bank network, but not the three-bank network, where th...
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作者：Plambeck, Erica L.; Taylor, Terry A.
作者单位：Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Firms have an incentive to test competitors' products to reveal violations of safety and environmental standards, in order to have competitors' products blocked from sale. This paper shows that testing by a regulator crowds out testing by competitors, and can reduce firms' efforts to comply with the product standard. Relying on competitor testing (i.e., having the regulator test only to verify evidence of violations provided by competitors) is most effective in large or concentrated markets in...
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作者：Nguyen, Jason; Donohue, Karen; Mehrotra, Mili
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This paper analyzes the energy efficiency (EE) investment decisions of a capital-constrained manufacturer that competes with an alternative supplier for the business of a large industrial buyer. Through a series of game-theoretic models, we characterize when it is beneficial for the buyer to offer EE instruments, including assessment assistance and procurement commitment, and how these instruments interact with third-party assessment assistance to affect the supplier's EE investment level. We ...
