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作者：He, Shuangchi; Sim, Melvyn; Zhang, Meilin
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS)
摘要：Emergency care necessitates adequate and timely treatment, which has unfortunately been compromised by crowding in many emergency departments (EDs). To address this issue, we study patient scheduling in EDs so that mandatory targets imposed on each patient's door-to-provider time and length of stay can be collectively met with the largest probability. Exploiting patient flow data from the ED, we propose a hybrid robustst-ochastic approach to formulating the patient scheduling problem, which al...
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作者：Harford, Jarrad; Schonlau, Robert; Stanfield, Jared
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University System of Ohio; Miami University; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：The economic links between firms created by customer and supplier relationships are critical determinants of those firms' values and actions. We demonstrate that significant trade relationships and indirect economic links incrementally explain which firms are more likely to be involved in acquisitions, which pairs of firms are more likely to merge, and which mergers will have the greatest impact, both on value and in motivating follow-on mergers by rivals. Firms with major trade relationships ...
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作者：Lambrecht, Anja; Tucker, Catherine
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We explore data from a field test of how an algorithm delivered ads promoting job opportunities in the science, technology, engineering and math fields. This ad was explicitly intended to be gender neutral in its delivery. Empirically, however, fewer women saw the ad than men. This happened because younger women are a prized demographic and are more expensive to show ads to. An algorithm that simply optimizes cost-effectiveness in ad delivery will deliver ads that were intended to be gender ne...
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作者：Bimpikis, Kostas; Ehsani, Shayan; Ilkilic, Rahmi
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University; Universidad de Chile
摘要：The paper considers a model of competition among firms that produce a homogeneous good in a networked environment. A bipartite graph determines which subset of markets a firm can supply to. Firms compete A la Cournot and decide how to allocate their production output to the markets they are directly connected to. We provide a characterization of the production quantities at the unique equilibrium of the resulting game for any given network. Our results identify a novel connection between the e...
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作者：Hong, Fuhai; Huang, Wei; Zhao, Xiaojian
作者单位：Lingnan University; Nanyang Technological University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Monash University
摘要：The sunk cost effect has been widely observed in individual decisions. Building on an intrapersonal self-management game, the paper theoretically shows that the sunk cost effect may stem from an attempt to overcome the underinvestment problem associated with a high degree of present bias or to resolve the multi-selves coordination problem when the degree of present bias is low. Especially for individuals with severe present bias, the current self may take a costly action (which is a sunk cost ...
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作者：Berman, Oded; Fazel-Zarandi, Mohammad M.; Krass, Dmitry
作者单位：University of Toronto; Yale University
摘要：This paper shows that operational flexibility interacting with informational uncertainty may lead to truthful information exchange in equilibrium even when the communication is nonbinding and unverifiable, i.e., cheap talk. We consider a model consisting of a manufacturer releasing a new product with uncertain release date and demand, and a retailer who must determine the allocation of limited capacity between a preexisting third-party product and the manufacturer's new product that may or may...
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作者：Schneider, Florian H.; Schonger, Martin
作者单位：University of Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：Most models of ambiguity aversion satisfy the Anscombe-Aumann monotonicity axiom. Monotonicity implies a weak form of separability of preferences across events that occur with unknown probability. We construct a test of weak separability by modifying the Allais paradox, adapting it to the Anscombe-Aumann framework. Three experimental studies are conducted. Study 1 finds frequent, systematic violations of weak separability in the lab. These findings replicate in study 2, where we employ a subje...
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作者：Xin, Mingdi; Choudhary, Vidyanand
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：How does competition impact firms' incentive to innovate by investing in information technology (IT)? Prior literature suggests opposite predictions on the direction in which competition drives IT investment. This paper analyzes a game theoretic model of duopoly competition and shows that an important feature of IT sheds new light on firms' investment decisions: IT implementation can fail. Without the possibility of implementation failure, the opportunity to invest in IT hurts firms' profits b...
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作者：Custodio, Claudia; Ferreira, Miguel A.; Matos, Pedro
作者单位：Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of Virginia
摘要：We show that firms with chief executive officers (CEOs) who gain general managerial skills over their lifetime of work experience produce more patents. We address the potential endogenous CEO-firm matching bias using firm-CEO fixed effects and variation in the enforceability of noncompete agreements across states and over time during the CEO's career. Our findings suggest that generalist CEOs spur innovation because they acquire knowledge beyond the firm's current technological domain, and the...
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作者：Inderst, Roman; Vladimirov, Vladimir
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We analyze how relationship finance, such as venture capital and relationship lending, affects growth firms' capital structure choices. We show that relationship investors that obtain a strong bargaining position because of their privileged information about the firm optimally cash in on their dominance by pushing it to finance follow-up investments with equity. The firm underinvests if its owner refuses to accept the associated dilution. However, this problem is mitigated if the firm's initia...
