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作者：Cassar, Lea; Klein, Arnd H.
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Zurich
摘要：People vary in what they view as a fair distribution of earnings in organizations and, more generally, society. Where do these different views originate? We study the question of whether the experience of failure or success in a winner-take-most competition shapes people's perspectives about distributive justice. In a laboratory experiment, subjects generated a high or low income either through a lottery or through a performance-based tournament. A subset of subjects could then redistribute th...
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作者：Morgan, John; Tumlinson, Justin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Loughborough University; University of Munich
摘要：Milton Friedman famously suggested that firms ought not divert profits toward public goods because shareholders can better make these contributions themselves. Despite this, activist shareholders are increasingly successful in persuading firms to be socially responsible. We study firm behavior when shareholders care about public goods as well as profits and when managerial contracts reflect these concerns. Under these ideal conditions, managers redirect more profits toward public goods than sh...
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作者：Chaudhuri, Shomesh E.; Lo, Andrew W.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：The value added by an active investor is traditionally measured using alpha, tracking error, and the information ratio. However, these measures do not characterize the dynamic component of investor activity, nor do they consider the time horizons over which weights are changed. In this paper, we propose a technique to measure the value of active investment that captures both the static and dynamic contributions of an investment process. This dynamic alpha is based on the decomposition of a por...
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作者：Li, Hui
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper studies intertemporal price discrimination (IPD) with complementary products in the context of e-readers and e-books. Using individual-level data (2008-2012), I estimate a dynamic demand model for e-reader adoption and subsequent book quantity, reading format, and retailer choices in several book genres. I use the estimates to simulate a monopolist's optimal dynamic pricing strategies when facing forward-looking consumers. The results illustrate how skimming/penetration pricing ince...
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作者：Davis, Andrew M.; Hyndman, Kyle
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We study the impact of multidimensional bargaining and the location of inventory risk on the performance of a two-stage supply chain. We conduct a controlled human subjects experiment where a retailer and supplier either interact through ultimatum offers or dynamically bargain over contract terms, including a wholesale price and, potentially, an order quantity. We also manipulate whether the risk associated with unsold inventory lies with the retailer or the supplier or is endogenously determi...
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作者：Chen, Yiwei; Farias, Vivek F.; Trichakis, Nikolaos
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider a canonical revenue management (RM) problem wherein a monopolist seller posts prices for multiple products that are for sale over a fixed horizon so as to maximize expected revenues. Products are differentiated and subject to joint capacity constraints. Arriving customers are forward looking and strategize on the timing of their purchase, an empirically confirmed aspect of modern customer behavior. In the event that customers were myopic, foundational work has established that stat...
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作者：Ma, Linlin; Tang, Yuehua
作者单位：Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：This paper studies the effect of portfolio manager ownership (i.e., skin in the game) on mutual fund risk taking. Using holdings-based risk change measures that capture managers' ex ante risk choices, we find that portfolio manager ownership reduces both intrayear and across-year risk-taking activities. The relationship between ownership and risk reduction is particularly strong among managers with high agency issue-induced risk-taking incentives-for example, managers who face a more convex fl...
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作者：Anand, Krishnan S.; Goyal, Manu
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：Our dynamic model of information technology (IT) outsourcing integrates incomplete contracts, moral hazard, and adverse selection under both perfect and, more realistically, bounded rationality. In addition to the classical profit-maximizing firm unconstrained by ethics, we model an ethically constrained (but otherwise profit-maximizing) firm that honors its contractual obligations irrespective of legal restraints. We prove that under bounded rationality, the ethically constrained firm can obt...
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作者：Tian, Fang; Sosic, Greys; Debo, Laurens
作者单位：Pepperdine University; University of Southern California; Dartmouth College
摘要：Rather than organizing disposal of consumer-generated waste themselves, many states and countries have passed legislation that makes producers responsible for the proper disposal (i.e., recycling) of the products that they bring to the market. We study the stability of producers' strategies emerging under such legislation. In our paper, the producers compete with multiple differentiated products in consumer markets but may consider cooperating when recycling those products to benefit from econ...
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作者：Coffman, Lucas C.; Gotthard-Real, Alexander
作者单位：Harvard University; Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
摘要：Can an organization avoid blame for an unpopular action when an adviser advises it to do it? We present experimental evidence suggesting this is the case-advice to be selfish substantially decreases punishment of being selfish. Further, this result is true despite advisers' misaligned incentives, known to all: Through a relational contract incentive, advisers are motivated to tell the decision makers what they want to hear. Through incentivized elicitations, we find suggestive evidence that ad...
