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作者：Meng, Xiaojing; Tian, Jie Joyce
作者单位：New York University; University of Waterloo
摘要：We investigate how board expertise affects chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and firm value. The CEO engages in a sequence of tasks: first acquiring information to evaluate a potential project, then reporting his or her assessment of the project to the board, and finally implementing the project if it is adopted. We demonstrate that the CEO receives higher compensation when the board agrees with the CEO on the assessment of the project. Board expertise leads to (weakly) better investmen...
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作者：Fuchs, Christoph; de Jong, Martijn G.; Schreier, Martin
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：Charity organizations differ in their practice of offering donors the option to earmark their contribution: allowing donors to select the project in which their money should be invested. This paper presents two studies that provide the first empirical evidence on the appeal of such earmarking. The empirical basis of Study 1 is a unique data set consisting of 7,383 potential donors from 25 countries who participated in a randomized survey experiment. First, we find that the willingness to donat...
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作者：Cui, Ruomeng; Li, Meng; Li, Qiang
作者单位：Emory University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Camden; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：Consumers regard product delivery as an important service component that influences their shopping decisions on online retail platforms. Delivering products to customers in a timely and reliable manner enhances customer experience and companies' profitability. In this research, we explore the extent to which customers value a high-quality delivery experience when shopping online. Our identification strategy exploits a natural experiment: a clash between SF Express and Alibaba, the largest priv...
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作者：Friedman, Henry L.; Heinle, Mirko S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We examine a setting in which agents can form lobbying coalitions to influence a policy maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each other's lobbying and gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition formation causes the effects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying activity and policy strength to be nonmonotonic. Our model suggests that inc...
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作者：Levy, Haim
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In theorem 1 given in my paper, Aging Population, Retirement, and Risk Taking [Levy H (2016a) Aging population, retirement, and risk taking. Management Sci. 62(5):1415-1430.], there is indeed a technical error. Yet, adding one condition to the theorem (which can be added in two alternate ways) is sufficient to ensure the dominance of stocks over bonds in the very long run. For the commonly employed preferences, the empirical evidence conforms with the claim given in my original theorem 1, asse...
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作者：Long, Xiaoyang; Nasiry, Javad; Wu, Yaozhong
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; National University of Singapore
摘要：In uncertain environments, project reviews provide an opportunity to make continue or abandon decisions and thereby maximize a project's expected payoff. We experimentally investigate continue/abandon decisions in a multistage project under two conditions: when the project is reviewed at every stage and when review opportunities are limited. Our results confirm findings in the literature that project abandonment tends to be delayed; yet, we also observe premature termination. Decisions are hig...
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作者：Spiller, Stephen A.; Reinholtz, Nicholas; Maglio, Sam J.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University Toronto Scarborough
摘要：Time-series data-measurements of a quantity over time-can be presented as stocks (the quantity at each point in time) or flows (the change in quantity from one point in time to the next). In a series of six experiments, we find that the choice of presenting data as stocks or flows can have a consequential impact on judgments. The same data can lead to positive or negative assessments when presented as stocks versus flows and can engender optimistic or pessimistic forecasts for the future. For ...
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作者：Towner, Mitch
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：Using the healthcare industry as a novel laboratory, I study whether a firm's use of debt enhances its bargaining power during negotiations with nonfinancial stakeholders. I find that reimbursement rates negotiated between a hospital and insurers for two homogeneous procedures are higher when the hospital has more debt. This relation is stronger among hospitals with less bargaining power relative to insurers ex ante. The evidence is consistent with the idea that debt improves a firm's bargaini...
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作者：Asadpour, Arash; Wang, Xuan; Zhang, Jiawei
作者单位：New York University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We consider a class of online resource-allocation problems in which there are n types of resources with limited initial inventory and n demand classes. The resources are flexible in that each type of resource can serve more than one demand class. In this paper, we focus on a special class of structures with limited flexibility, the long-chain design, which was proposed by Jordan and Graves [Jordan WC, Graves SC (1995) Principles on the benefits of manufacturing process flexibility. Management ...
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作者：Cui, Shiliang; Wang, Zhongbin; Yang, Luyi
作者单位：Georgetown University; Nankai University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This paper studies an emerging business model of line-sitting in which customers seeking service can hire others (line-sitters) to wait in line on behalf of them. We develop a queueing-game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among customers, the line-sitting firm, and the service provider to examine the impact of line-sitting on the service provider's revenue and customer welfare. We also contrast line-sitting with the well-known priority purchasing scheme, as both allow customers t...
