Debt and Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from US Hospitals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Towner, Mitch
• 署名单位: University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3291
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2083-2098
• 关键词: capital structure; bargaining; debt; leverage; Healthcare

摘要

Using the healthcare industry as a novel laboratory, I study whether a firm's use of debt enhances its bargaining power during negotiations with nonfinancial stakeholders. I find that reimbursement rates negotiated between a hospital and insurers for two homogeneous procedures are higher when the hospital has more debt. This relation is stronger among hospitals with less bargaining power relative to insurers ex ante. The evidence is consistent with the idea that debt improves a firm's bargaining power.