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作者：Andreoni, James; Serra-Garcia, Marta
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：What is the value of pledges if they are often reneged upon? In this paper, we show-both theoretically and experimentally-that pledges can be used to screen donors and to better understand their motives for giving. In return, nonprofit managers can use the information they glean from pledges to better target future charitable giving appeals and interventions to donors, such as expressions of gratitude. In an experiment, we find that offering the option to pledge gifts induces self-selection. I...
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作者：Osadchiy, Nikolay; Schmidt, William; Wu, Jing
作者单位：Emory University; Cornell University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We offer a new network perspective on one of the central topics in operations management-the bullwhip effect (BWE). The topic has both practical and scholarly implications. We start with an observation: the variability of orders placed to suppliers is larger than the variability of sales to customers for most firms, yet the aggregate demand variability felt by suppliers upstream does not amplify commensurably. We hypothesize that changes to the supplier's customer base can smooth out its aggre...
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作者：Powers, Eric
作者单位：University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
摘要：There is substantial variation in fixed-price call provision terms-call price premium and call protection. I investigate determinants of call price, call protection, and estimated call option value. Consistent with agency theory and asymmetric information models, I find that lower credit quality and opaque issuers choose higher call premiums, longer call protection, and overall less valuable call options. Higher-quality issuers, particularly financial institutions that struggle when interest r...
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作者：Kouvelis, Panos; Xiao, Guang; Yang, Nan
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Hong Kong Polytechnic University; University of Miami
摘要：Price postponement is an effective mechanism to hedge against the adverse effect of supply random yield. However, its effectiveness and the resulting production decisions have not been studied for risk-averse firms. In this paper, we investigate the impact of price postponement and risk aversion under supply yield risk. Specifically, we study a risk-averse monopoly firm's production and pricing decisions under supply random yield with two distinct pricing schemes: (1) ex ante pricing in which ...
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作者：Delecourt, Solene; Fitzpatrick, Anne
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Boston
摘要：The previous literature documents that female-owned businesses are less profit-able than male-owned businesses, including microenterprises that make up the majority of firms in developing countries. In this paper, we uncover an overlooked gendered constraint for these businesses: childcare. We collect field data through unannounced visits to a sample of microentrepreneurs in select areas of Uganda, combining surveys of business owners and real customers, as well as purchases by confederate buy...
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作者：Chang, Ching-Hung; Wu, Qingqing
作者单位：National Taiwan University; National Taiwan University; University System of Ohio; Xavier University
摘要：This paper studies whether board connectedness affects corporate innovation. We find that well-connected boards have a positive effect on innovation activities and quality. The effect is stronger when firms have higher demand for advising or face more severe agency problems. Firms with greater needs for external finance benefit more from board connections with bankers. We show that the positive relation is causal and robust based on a battery of empirical tests including exogenous variation in...
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作者：Huang, Wenqian; Menkveld, Albert J.; Yu, Shihao
作者单位：Bank for International Settlements (BIS); Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：Time is valuable, particularly in stressed markets. Because central counterparties (CCPs) have become systemically important, we need to understand the dynamics of their exposure toward clearing members at high frequencies. We track such exposure and decompose it, yielding the following insights. The composition of CCP exposure is fundamentally different in the tails. At extreme levels or during rapid increases, there is elevated crowding. This is the result of clearing members all concentrati...
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作者：Bavafa, Hessam; Jonasson, Jonas Oddur
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The expansive learning curve literature in operations management has established how various facets of prior experience improve average performance. In this paper, we explore how increased cumulative experience affects performance variability or consistency. We use a two-stage estimation method of a heteroskedastic learning curve model to examine the relationship between experience and performance variability among paramedics at the London Ambulance Service. We find that, for paramedics with l...
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作者：Chen, Zhiyao; Strebulaev, Ilya A.; Xing, Yuhang; Zhang, Xiaoyan
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rice University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We find strong empirical support for the risk-shifting mechanism to account for the puzzling negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns. First, equity holders take on investments with high idiosyncratic risk when their firms are in distress and receive less monitoring from institutional holders as well as when the aggregate economy is in a bad state. Second, the strategically increased idiosyncratic volatility decreases equity betas, particularly in bad states ...
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作者：Gupta, Sudip; Sundaram, Rangarajan K.; Sundaresan, Suresh
作者单位：Fordham University; New York University; Columbia University
摘要：In this paper, we examine a novel two-stage mechanism for selling government securities, wherein the dealers underwrite in the first stage the sale of securities, which are auctioned in stage 2 via either a discriminatory auction (DA) or a uniform price auction (UPA). Using proprietary data on auctions during 2006-2013, we find that (a) the first stage underwriting auction generates significant information, including predicting the likelihood of devolvement, and bid shading, and (b) the outcom...
