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作者:Bongaerts, Dion; Schlingemann, Frederik
作者单位:Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; European Corporate Governance Institute
摘要:We investigate whether and through which channel credit rating downgrades induce corporate restructurings. For a comprehensive sample, we find a strong and robust link between rating actions and subsequent restructuring activity and hypothesize these could be disciplinary (ex post efficient) or meant to counter tighter financial constraints (ex post inefficient). Based on the self-reported restructuring types and the choice of assets sold, we find evidence for rating-induced asset sales aimed ...
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作者:Burkovskaya, Anastasia; Li, Jian
作者单位:University of Sydney; Iowa State University
摘要:Financial companies often use disclosure statements (DSs) to categorize uncertain contingencies into different sections (e.g., a health insurance plan includes sections such as hospital coverage and dental coverage). We model DSs as information partitions of the state space, which influence how a consumer perceives her choice problem and how she makes her demand decisions. We study a consumer with weakly separable preferences, which allows us to define event-risk attitude to the DS's categorie...
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作者:Shin, Dongwook; Zeevi, Assaf
作者单位:Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Columbia University
摘要:This paper investigates the problem of information sharing between a retail platform and a manufacturer in a supply chain. We develop a stylized model salient to which is that the product's quality is a priori unknown to customers, who can infer it from customer-generated reviews. The platform, in turn, has access to private information concerning the relationship between quality and demand, and the manufacturer can choose to acquire said information to help determine the quality of its produc...
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作者:Glennon, Britta
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania
摘要:Highly skilled workers are not only a crucial and relatively scarce input into firms' productive and innovative processes, but are also a critical resource determining competitive advantage. An increasingly high proportion of these workers in the United States were born abroad and permitted to work on skilled worker visas. How do multinational firms respond when artificial constraints, namely, policies restricting skilled immigration, are placed on their ability to hire scarce human capital? T...
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作者:Ellul, Andrew; Wang, Cong; Zhang, Kuo
作者单位:Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要:Unemployment risk influences workers' incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. This paper investigates the impact of unemployment risk on chief executive officers (CEOs)' risk-taking incentive compensation. Exploiting state-level changes in unemployment benefits, we find that after unemployment insurance benefits become more generous, boards increase the convex payoff structure of CEO pay to encourage risk taking. The increase in CEOs' convexity payoff is stronger in firms with mor...
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作者:Carroni, Elias; Madio, Leonardo; Shekhar, Shiva
作者单位:University of Padua; Tilburg University
摘要:In most platform environments, the exclusive provision of premium content from leading creators (superstars) is used as a strategy to boost user participation and secure a competitive edge vis-a`-vis rivals. In this article, we study the impact of superstar exclusive content provision on platform competition and complementors' homing decisions. Two competing platforms facilitate interactions between consumers and suppliers, of which the latter are identified by the superstar and a fringe of co...
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作者:Schoar, Antoinette; Yeung, Kelvin; Zuo, Luo
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); City University of Hong Kong; Cornell University
摘要:Tracking the movement of top managers across firms, we document the importance of manager-specific fixed effects in explaining heterogeneity in firm exposures to systematic risk. In equilibrium, manager fixed effects on systematic risk are positively related with manager fixed effects on stock returns. These differences in systematic risk are partially explained by managers' corporate strategies, such as their preferences for internal growth and financial conservatism. The early career experie...
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作者:Bertazzi, Luca; Mogre, Riccardo; Trichakis, Nikolaos
作者单位:University of Brescia; Durham University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:We deal with the problem of managing a project or a complex operational process by controlling the execution pace of the activities it comprises. We consider a setting in which these activities are clearly defined, are subject to precedence constraints, and progress randomly. We formulate a discrete -time, infinite -horizon Markov decision process in which the manager reviews progress in each period and decides which activities to expedite to balance expediting costs with delay costs. We deriv...
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作者:Gans, Joshua S.; Halaburda, Hanna
作者单位:University of Toronto; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要:The core premise of permissionless blockchains is their reliable and secure operation without the need to trust any individual agent. At the heart of blockchain consensus mechanisms is an explicit cost (e.g., mining cost) for participation in the network and the opportunity to add blocks to the blockchain. A key rationale for that cost is to make attacks on the network, which could be theoretically carried out if a majority of nodes were controlled by a single entity, too expensive to be worth...
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作者:Van Parys, Bart; Golrezaei, Negin
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:We study structured multiarmed bandits, which is the problem of online decision -making under uncertainty in the presence of structural information. In this problem, the decision -maker needs to discover the best course of action despite observing only uncertain rewards over time. The decision -maker is aware of certain convex structural information regarding the reward distributions; that is, the decision -maker knows that the reward distributions of the arms belong to a convex compact set. I...