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作者：Bohnet, I; Harmgart, H; Huck, S; Tyran, JR
作者单位：Harvard University; University of London; University College London; University of Copenhagen
摘要：We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. As orthodox theory would predict, we find that providing buyers with information about sellers' trading history boosts market performance. More surprisingly, this beneficial effect of incentives for reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers' trading history. This suggests that two-sided m...
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作者：Cifuentes, R; Ferrucci, G; Shin, HS
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper explores liquidity risk in a system of interconnected financial institutions when these institutions are subject to regulatory solvency constraints and mark their assets to market. When the market's demand for illiquid assets is less than perfectly elastic, sales by distressed institutions depress the market prices of such assets. Marking to market of the asset book can induce a further round of endogenously generated sales of assets, depressing prices further and inducing further s...
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作者：Field, E
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper examines the effect of changes in tenure security on residential investment in urban squatter neighborhoods. To address the endogeneity of property fights, I make use of variation in ownership status induced by a nationwide titling program in Peru. In a difference-in-difference analysis, I compare the change in housing investment before and after the program among participating households to the change in investment among two samples of nonparticipants. My results indicate that stre...
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作者：Kübler, D; Weizsäcker, G
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Yes, they are. We consider data from experimental cascade games that were run in different laboratories, and find uniformly that subjects are more willing to follow the crowd, the bigger the crowd is-although the decision makers who are added to the crowd should in theory simply follow suit and hence reveal no information. This correlation of length and strength of cascades appears consistently across games with different parameters and different choice sets for the subjects. It is also observ...
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作者：Fridolfsson, SO; Stennek, J
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：We provide a possible explanation for the empirical puzzle that mergers often reduce profits, but raise share prices. If being,in insider is better than being an Outsider, firms may merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival. The insiders' stock market value is increased, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. These results are derived in an endogenous-merger model, predicting the conditions under which mergers occur, when they occur, and how the surplus is shared.
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作者：Del Negro, M; Schorfheide, F
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper uses a novel method for conducting policy analysis with potentially misspecified DSGE models and applies it to a simple New Keynesian DSGE model. We illustrate the sensitivity of the results to assumptions on the policy invariance of model misspecifications.
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作者：Banks, J; Blundell, R; Emmerson, C
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We examine the possible consequences of the increasing shift from Defined Benefit to Detined Contribution arrangements for private pensions. Whilst much analysis has focused on the possible distribution of investment and job tenure risk, we point out the additional role for issues relating to adverse selection and to retirement incentives. These issues are illustrated using empirical evidence from the United Kingdom, where the fact that private pensions are an alternative, as opposed to a supp...
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作者：Claessens, S; Laeven, L
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：The relationships among competition in the financial sector, access of firms to external financing, and associated economic growth are ambiguous in theory. Moreover, measuring competition in the financial sector can be complex. In this paper we first estimate for 16 countries an industrial organization-based measure of banking system competition. We then relate this competition measure to growth of industries and find that greater competition in Countries' banking systems allows financially de...
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作者：Choi, JP
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：Patent protection has gradually expanded over time, and many patents of suspect value are routinely granted owing to the lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process. This has resulted in the recent explosion of patents granted and potentially creates a patent thicket that hinders future innovation. I investigate the question of whether the litigation process can be relied on to restore competition when an imperfect market outcome is sustained through patents of suspect value. The anal...
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作者：Gale, D; Özgür, O
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We study the effect of relative risk aversion on optimal capital structure in a general-equilibrium model of intermediation with incomplete markets.
