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作者：Feenstra, RC; Gagnon, JE; Knetter, MM
作者单位：Dartmouth College; University of California System; University of California Davis; Federal Reserve System - USA; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Using a Bertrand differentiated products model we show that pass-through should be high for exporters based in a country with a very large share of total destination market sales. For source countries with small and intermediate market shares, the relationship is potentially nonlinear and sensitive to assumptions about demand and firm interactions. The model is estimated using a panel data set of automobile exports from four source countries to 12 destination markets over the period 1970-88. T...
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作者：Flood, RP; Garber, PM; Kramer, C
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：in the literature on speculative attacks on a fixed exchange rate it is usually assumed that the monetary authority responsible for fixing the rate reacts passively to the monetary disruption caused by the attack. This assumption is grossly at odds with actual experience where the monetary base implications of the attacks are usually sterilized. Such sterilization means that the attack is no longer exclusively a monetary event and requires that the standard attack model be broadened to include...
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作者：Brecher, RA; Choudhri, EU; Schembri, LL
作者单位：Carleton University
摘要：This paper develops and tests a hua-country model of a monopolistically competitive industry in which the production function shifts endogenously via national and international spillovers of knowledge. The basic version of this model implies that, in the long run, the growth rate of sectoral productivity is the same in each country. In support of this version, for a number of matched Canadian and US manufacturing industries, the paper finds that these two countries' rates of sectoral productiv...
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作者：Keuschnigg, C; Kohler, W
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Johannes Kepler University Linz
摘要：We explore liberalization of trade in differentiated commodities using a model featuring monopolistic competition and capital accumulation, We identify a mechanism of 'cumulative causation' in investment and an associated externality leading to under-accumulation. We provide long-run analytical results for a stylized core model and offer a quantitative treatment of transitional and sectoral issues using a disaggregate computational model. The aggregate welfare gains from unilateral liberalizat...
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作者：Sachs, J; Tornell, A; Velasco, A
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; New York University
摘要：We argue that allowing for the possibility of a self-fulfilling panic helps to understand several features of the recent Mexican crisis. Self-fulfilling expectations became decisive in generating a panic only after the government ran down gross reserves and ran up short-term dollar debt. We present a simple model to explain how and why multiple equilibria can occur for some levels of reserves or debt, but not for others. Lastly, we argue that the imperfect credibility of Mexican exchange rate ...
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作者：FernandezRuiz, J
摘要：The incentive problems associated with 'debt overhang' have been shown to make debt forgiveness potentially Pareto-improving. Models studying this argument abstract from the long-term character of the credit relationship. We show that the debt forgiveness argument is strengthened when incentive problems are considered in a multi-period context.
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作者：Smith, GW
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作者：Friedman, D; Fung, KC
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：Masahiko Aoki and others have distinguished two alternative modes for a firm's internal organization. We argue that the profitability of each mode depends on the distribution of firms across modes and on the general economic environment. We characterize the evolutionary equilibria in both a parametric and a general model, and argue that corner equilibria predominate. We analyze the effects of trade between the two countries in (a) outputs only and (b) inputs (factors) as well as outputs. Our m...
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作者：Levinsohn, J
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作者：CASSING, JH
