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作者：LAFFONT, JJ
摘要：The new economics of regulation is an application of the principal-agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms. After a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed. A survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided, in particular concerning the implementation of optimal contracts by...
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作者：ANDREWS, DWK
摘要：This paper establishes a correspondence in large samples between classical hypothesis tests and Bayesian posterior odds tests for models without trends. More specifically, tests of point null hypotheses and one- or two-sided alternatives are considered (where nuisance parameters may be present under both hypotheses). It is shown that for certain priors the Bayesian posterior odds test is equivalent in large samples to classical Wald, Lagrange multiplier, and likelihood ratio tests for some sig...
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作者：EPSTEIN, LG; WANG, T
作者单位：University of Waterloo
摘要：In conformity with the Savage model of decision-making, modem asset pricing theory assumes that agents' beliefs about the likelihoods of future states of the world may be represented by a probability measure. As a result, no meaningful distinction is allowed between risk, where probabilities are available to guide choice, and uncertainty, where information is too imprecise to be summarized adequately by probabilities. In contrast, Knight and Keynes emphasized the distinction between risk and u...
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作者：BOLDRIN, M; RUSTICHINI, A
作者单位：New York University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study the indeterminacy of equilibria in infinite horizon capital accumulation models with technological externalities. Our investigation encompasses models with bounded and unbounded accumulation paths, and models with one and two sectors of production. Under reasonable assumptions we find that equilibria are locally unique in one-sector economies. In economies with two sectors of production it is instead easy to construct examples where a positive external effect induces a two-dimensional...
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作者：FRAYSSE, J
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作者：MITTNIK, S; ZADROZNY, PA
摘要：Formulas are derived for computing asymptotic covariance matrices of sets of impulse responses, step responses, or variance decompositions of estimated dynamic simultaneous-equations models in vector autoregressive moving-average (VARMA) form. Computed covariances would be used to test linear restrictions on sets of impulse responses, step responses, or variance decompositions. The results unify and extend previous formulas to handle any model in VARMA form, provide accurate computations based...
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作者：KANDORI, M; MAILATH, GJ; ROB, R
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We analyze an evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with noise or mutations. The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked-as usual-to their current relative success, but mutations-which perturb the system away from its deterministic evolution-are present as well. Mutations can occur in every period, so the focus is on the implications of ongoing mutations, not a one-shot mutation. The effect of these mutations is to drastically reduce the set of equilibria to what we ...
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作者：SHERMAN, RP
摘要：Han's maximum rank correlation (MRC) estimator is shown to be square-root n-consistent and asymptotically normal. The proof rests on a general method for determining the asymptotic distribution of a maximization estimator, a simple U-statistic decomposition, and a uniform bound for degenerate U-processes. A consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix is provided, along with a result giving the explicit form of this matrix for any model within the scope of the MRC estimator. The la...
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作者：AUSUBEL, LM; DENECKERE, RJ
摘要：This paper analyzes a class of alternating-offer bargaining games with one-sided incomplete information for the case of no gap. If sequential equilibria are required to satisfy the additional restrictions of stationarity, monotonicity, pure strategies, and no free screening, we establish the Silence Theorem: When the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short, the informed party never makes any serious offers in the play of alternating-offer bargaining games. A class o...
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作者：ROBSON, AJ
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper supposes an individual cares about his/her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces. The implications for risk-taking are investigated in particular. Such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave-convex-concave utility described by Friedman and Savage. However, there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone. For example, an equilibrium wealth distribution here may ha...
