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作者：Li, Nan; Papageorgiou, Chris; Xu, Tong; Zha, Tao
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Emory University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use financial reforms as a case study to understand the temporal clustering of policy changes across countries, shedding light on the broader phenomenon of global policy contagion. We construct a comprehensive database of domestic financial reforms spanning 90 countries from 1973 to 2014. Using this dataset, we estimate a semistructural model that incorporates key factors identified in the literature. We find that (1) geopolitical influence and cross-country learning drove the global surge ...
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作者：Malpede, Maurizio
作者单位：University of Pavia; Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici (CMCC)
摘要：Although extractive industries have been associated with women's empowerment and lower infant mortality in Africa, this article provides evidence that the rapid increase in the demand for lithium-ion batteries reduced the education rates of children living in cobalt mining villages in sub-Saharan Africa. Children exposed to cobalt mining also exhibit slower cognitive and physical development than those living in noncobalt mining communities. The estimates are robust to spatial spillover effect...
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作者：Sloof, Randolph; Beetsma, Roel; Steinweg, Alina
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Copenhagen Business School; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We study optimal debt ceilings in a political-agency model with uncertainty about both policymaker type (benevolent or selfish) and economic state (good or bad). Elections generate disciplining and selection effects that differ across pooling, hybrid, and separating equilibria induced by different ceilings. The optimal ceiling trades off distorted intertemporal allocation under benevolent policymakers against excessive debt under selfish ones. Increased fiscal transparency appears ineffective ...
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作者：Dato, Simon; Grunewald, Andreas; Klumper, Andreas
作者单位：European Business School (EBS) University; Frankfurt School Finance & Management; University of Bonn
摘要：Human decision making often seems to be determined by the resolution of intrapersonal conflict. This paper conceptualizes the analysis of decisions governed by such dual-self processes in individual decision contexts and strategic interactions. For this purpose, we define the solution concept Dual-Selves Equilibrium and derive sufficient conditions for the existence of such equilibria. We show that our framework also helps to study the strategic interaction between boundedly rational players t...
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作者：Fournier, Gaetan; Grillo, Alberto; Tsodikovich, Yevgeny
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. This allows them to increase the chances of a costless victory when the information is strongly in their favor. Our theory highlights a dynamic of moderation dur...
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作者：Guler, Bulent; Michaud, Amanda
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：We argue that transitional dynamics play a critical role in evaluating the effects of punitive incarceration reform on crime, inequality, and labor markets. Individuals' past choices regarding crime and employment under previous policies have persistent consequences that limit their responsiveness to policy changes. A quantitative model of this theory, calibrated using administrative data, predicts nuanced dynamics of crime and incarceration that are distinct across property and violent crime ...
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作者：Greinecker, Michael; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：University of Graz
摘要：A wide variety of financial instruments allows risk-averse traders to reduce their exposure to risk. This raises the question of what financial instruments allow ambiguity-averse traders to reduce their exposure to ambiguity. We show in this paper that price-contingent orders, such as limit orders, are sufficient: In a two-period trading model, an ambiguity-averse trader who trades with limit orders is observationally indistinguishable from an ambiguity-neutral trader with the same risk prefer...
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作者：Dioikitopoulos, Evangelos V.; Varvarigos, Dimitrios
作者单位：Athens University of Economics & Business; University of Leicester
摘要：We highlight the role of economic materialism as a cultural phenomenon of significance in relation to economic transformation and development. By inducing material aspirations, an endogenous cultural change toward more widespread adherence to materialistic values is both a cause and an effect of productivity growth. This cultural-economic complementarity is a powerful mechanism of endogenous productivity growth; it also determines the prevalence of different cultural values vis-& agrave;-vis t...
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作者：Noda, Shunya; Okumura, Kyohei; Hashimoto, Yoshinori
作者单位：University of Tokyo; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study the stability of cryptocurrency systems through difficulty adjustment. Bitcoin's difficulty adjustment algorithm (DAA) exhibits instability when the reward elasticity of the hash rate is high, implying that a sharp price reduction could disrupt the current Bitcoin system. By contrast, newer DAAs developed and installed for other cryptocurrencies remain stably under substantially weaker conditions; thus, Bitcoin can inherently address this concern by upgrading its DAA. However, miners ...
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作者：Yang, Zaifu; Yu, Jingsheng
作者单位：University of Macau; University of York - UK; Wuhan University
摘要：This paper proposes an efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic auction for selling multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods when bidders have unit demand, quasi-linear preferences, and hard budgets. Valuations and budgets are private information. The auction generates an efficient outcome that is not only in the core but also strongly Pareto efficient. When no bidder is budget-constrained, the auction returns a Walrasian equilibrium with the minimal equilibrium prices.
