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作者：Qian, Nancy; Tabellini, Marco
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Harvard University
摘要：This paper documents that the Pearl Harbor attack triggered a sharp increase in volunteer enlistment rates of American men, the magnitude of the increase was smaller for Black men than for White men and the Black-White gap was larger in counties with higher levels of racial discrimination. The results suggest that political exclusion and discrimination can undermine support for the government during critical times such as war.
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作者：Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher
作者单位：University of Bonn; Northwestern University
摘要：Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions like bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and limitations on sellers' commitment abilities. This paper develops an auction model that captures such frictions. We derive novel insights, notably that outcomes are often inefficient, that markets sometimes unravel, and that the observability of competition...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Renault, Regis
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We formulate a tractable model of pricing under directed search with heterogeneous firm demands. Demand characteristics drive bids in a position auction and enable us to bridge insights from the ordered search literature to those in the position auction literature. Equilibrium pricing implies that the marginal consumer's surplus decreases down the search order, so consumers optimally follow the firms' position ordering. A firm suffers from business stealing by firms that precede it and search ...
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作者：Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：A collective choice problem specifies a finite set of alternatives from which a group of expected utility maximizers must choose. We associate a collective pseudo market with every collective choice problem and establish the existence and efficiency of pseudo Lindahl equilibrium (PLE) allocations. We also associate a cooperative bargaining problem with every collective choice problem and define a set-valued solution concept, the omega-weighted Nash bargaining set where omega is a vector of wel...
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作者：Salant, Yuval; Spenkuch, Jorg L.
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a satisficing model of choice in which the available alternatives differ in their inherent complexity. We assume-and experimentally validate-that complexity leads to errors in the perception of alternatives' values. The model yields sharp predictions about the effect of complexity on choice probabilities, some of which qualitatively contrast with those of maximization-based choice models. We confirm the predictions of the satisficing model-and thus reject maximization-in a novel dat...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Tserenjigmid, Gerelt
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We revisit the recent revealed preference analysis of sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic consumers by Blow et al. [(2021), Non-parametric Analysis of Time-Inconsistent Preferences, The Review of Economic Studies, 88, 2687-2734] (BBC). We show that BBC's revealed preference test is too lax. There are non-rationalizable data that would pass their test. A basic problem with their test is that it requires finding a certain endogenous elasticity, without regard to the rationalizing utility. Their appro...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; University of Bonn; Yale University
摘要：We develop a model of multi-dimensional misspecified learning in which an overconfident agent learns about groups in society from observations of his and others' successes. We show that the average person sees his group relative to other groups too positively, and this in-group bias exhibits systematic comparative-statics patterns. First, a person is most likely to have negative opinions about other groups he competes with. Second, while information about another group's achievements does not ...
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作者：Celentano, Francesco; Rempel, Mark
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Toronto
摘要：How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs' persistent private information and reduce firms' public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cash flows. Equilibrium financing is driven by information rent differentials in CEO compensation. We validate and structurally estimate the model using firm listing and CEO compensation data. We find private (intangible) cash flows exhibit 63% higher ...
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：New York University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We study a bargaining game in which a seller can trade with one of two buyers, who have values h and l (h>l). The outside option principle (OOP) predicts that, as players become patient, the seller trades with the high-value buyer with probability converging to 1 at a price converging to max(h/2,l). While this prediction is supported by the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), a wide range of trading outcomes may emerge in subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs): in the patient limit, the seller can ob...
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作者：Kehrig, Matthias; Vincent, Nicolas
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：We document that most dispersion in marginal revenue products of inputs occurs across plants within firms rather than between firms. This is commonly thought to reflect misallocation: dispersion is bad. However, we show that eliminating frictions hampering internal capital markets in a multi-plant firm model may in fact increase productivity dispersion and raise output: dispersion can be good. This arises as firms optimally stagger investment activity across their plants over time to avoid rai...
