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作者：Nikpayam, Hossein; Schlapp, Tochen; Fleischmann, Moritz
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; University of Mannheim
摘要：In order to build a successful new product development (NPD) portfolio, a firm must ensure not only its access to a wide variety of candidate NPD projects but also its capacity to collect and verify vital information about these projects prior to project selection. In practice, a popular strategy to enrich the set of candidate projects is to contemplate investing in both internal and external NPD projects; however, this approach often interferes with the firm's ability to evaluate its own proj...
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作者：Delarue, Arthur; Lian, Zhen; Martin, Sebastien
作者单位：University of Virginia; Yale University; Northwestern University
摘要：In collaboration with the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD), this paper introduces an interactive optimization framework to tackle complex school scheduling challenges. The choice of school start and end times is an optimization challenge, as schedules influence the district's transportation system, and limiting the associated costs is a computationally difficult combinatorial problem. However, it is also a policy challenge, as transportation costs are far from the only consequence...
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作者：Patterson, Richard W.; Skimmyhorn, William
作者单位：Brigham Young University; National Bureau of Economic Research; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：How can we compare approaches to increase retirement savings? Messaging interventions, active choice frameworks, and automatic enrollment all increase retirement savings, but evidence supporting these approaches spans widely different institutional settings, populations, and time periods. In this study, we use experimental and quasiexperimental variation in these approaches within a constant setting using interventions in the U.S. military during 2016-2018. We find large differences in the eff...
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作者：Wang, Qiuqi; Wang, Ruodu; Ziegel, Johanna
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Waterloo; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：In the recent Basel Accords, the Expected Shortfall (ES) replaces the Value-at-Risk (VaR) as the standard risk measure for market risk in the banking sector, making it the most important risk measure in financial regulation. One of the most challenging tasks in risk modeling practice is to backtest ES forecasts provided by financial institutions. To design a model-free backtesting procedure for ES, we make use of the recently developed techniques of e-values and e-processes. Backtest e-statist...
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作者：Li, Meng; Pinto, Jedson
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We examine how initial public offerings (IPOs) influence employees' satisfaction with their employers. Using millions of company reviews and a generalized difference-indifferences method, we document that employees become less satisfied after their employers go public. The effect is driven by employees who joined the company before the IPO rather than those who joined after it and is stronger for employees whose tasks relate to regulatory compliance, for smaller firms, and firms with Big 4 aud...
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作者：Lu, Ying; Qiao, Dandan; He, Shu; Tan, Bernard C. Y.
作者单位：IE University; National University of Singapore; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：Despite the public's familiarity with search engines, little existing research empir-ically investigates the impact of such a search-cost-reduction tool on online market struc-ture. Knowledge scarcity of this question can mainly be attributed to the challenge of accessing detailed data from a cross-website search engine. Using data from the online ille-gal transaction platform, the Darknet markets, we manage to empirically evaluate the influ-ence of a cross-website search engine (i.e., GRAMS) ...
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作者：Lin, Chen; Lu, Fangzhou; Michaely, Roni; Qin, Shihua
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; European Corporate Governance Institute; Lingnan University
摘要：The structure of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) generates significant information asymmetry for public investors and provides a special role for its sponsors. Leveraging the unique characteristics of SPACs, this study reexamines the debate over the role of managerial network centrality in affecting M&A outcomes, namely, whether network centrality allows for more private benefits or rather adds value to firms and helps reduce information asymmetry. Specifically, we show that spons...
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作者：Chan, Timothy C. Y.; Chen, Ningyuan; Fernandes, Craig
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto
摘要：Superstar markets, where a small portion of individuals earn disproportionately high incomes, are common in fields like entrepreneurship, sports, and entertainment. Participants in these markets face significant income uncertainty, which can deter entry or prompt early exit. To address this difficulty, we propose income pools: contracts where individuals agree to share a portion of future earnings with pool members if a specific salary milestone is achieved. To date, hundreds of income pool co...
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作者：Poege, Felix; Gaessler, Fabian; Hoisl, Karin; Harhoff, Dietmar; Dorner, Matthias
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; University of Mannheim; Copenhagen Business School; University of Munich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We examine how collaborator loss affects the individual productivity of knowledge workers in corporate research and development (R&D). Specifically, we argue that the effect of such loss depends on whether the lost collaborator was internal or external to the organization, which may have compensatory measures in place to maintain the continuity of R&D efforts. To empirically investigate the effect of internal and external collaborator loss, we leverage 845 unexpected deaths of active inventors...
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作者：Castro-Pires, Henrique
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：We analyze the effects of retaliation on optimal contracts in a hierarchy consisting of a principal, a monitor, and an agent. With probability m, the monitor observes a signal about the agent's effort and decides what to report to the principal. With probability (1 - m), the monitor only observes an uninformative default signal realization. The agent retaliates against the monitor and the principal whenever the monitor's report reduces the agent's payment from an endogenously determined defaul...
