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作者：Li, Jian; Pegoraro, Stefano
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Notre Dame
摘要：We model credit competition between a bigtech platform and a bank lending to a merchant under limited commitment and asymmetric information about the merchant's incentives to default. The platform leverages its control over a marketplace to enforce partial loan repayments, enabling it to serve certain unbanked borrowers. When directly competing with the bank, the platform gains an endogenous screening advantage as borrowers with stronger incentives to default self-select into bank loans to avo...
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作者：Capponi, Agostino; Jia, Ruizhe; Yu, Shihao
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) allow traders to express their willingness to pay for quick execution through a public priority fee bidding mechanism. We provide evidence that high-fee DEX trades are more informative and contribute more to price discovery. Using address-level blockchain transaction data, we show that informed traders persistently bid higher fees to secure early execution, revealing a strong willingness to pay for execution priority. Further, analysis of Ethereum mempool data de...
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作者：Burkart, Mike; Lee, Samuel; Petri, Henrik
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Swedish House of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School; Santa Clara University; University of Gothenburg
摘要：We study the structure of public firm buyouts in a model that features the Berle-Means problem (lack of incentives) and the Grossman-Hart problem (holdout). We find that bootstrapping, debt in excess of funding needs, and upfront fees to bidders are socially optimal and increase buyout premiums. These elements make LBO financing tantamount to a management contract arranged by an outside manager to receive cash and incentives to manage a firm-except the cash is funded by excess debt imposed on ...
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作者：Cucic, Dominic; Gorea, Denis
作者单位：Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
摘要：We analyze the role of nonbank lenders in the transmission of monetary policy using data on the universe of unsecured credit to firms and households in Denmark. Nonbanks increase their credit supply after a monetary contraction, both relative to banks and in absolute terms. The increase in nonbank lending is financed through increased long-term debt. A model with segmented debt markets featuring differential investor rate sensitivities rationalizes these findings. Nonbank credit insulates corp...
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作者：Falato, Antonio; Favara, Giovanni; Scharfstein, David
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Harvard University
摘要：During the U.S. housing credit boom, publicly traded banks increased mortgage lending activity and relaxed standards much more than privately held banks. The increase in risk had real effects for a variety of county-level aggregates including employment and consumption. Cross-sectional evidence and a quasi-experiment indicate that the increase in risk stemmed from the institutional ownership and the equity compensation of publicly traded banks, in turn leading banks to place greater weight on ...
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作者：Li, Zigang; Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn; Renxuan, Wang
作者单位：University of Toronto; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; China Europe International Business School
摘要：Professional house price forecast data are consistent with a rational model where agents must learn about the parameters of the house price growth process and the underlying state of the housing market. Slow learning about the long-run mean generates overreaction to forecast revisions and a modest response of forecasts to lagged realizations. Heterogeneity in signals and priors about the long-run mean helps the model account for cross-sectional dispersion in forecasts. Introducing behavioral f...
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作者：Hansen, Peter Reinhard; Tong, Chen
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：We introduce a pricing kernel with time-varying volatility risk aversion to explain the observed time variations in the shape of the pricing kernel. When combined with the Heston-Nandi GARCH model, this framework yields a tractable option pricing model in which the variance risk ratio (VRR) emerges as a key variable. We show that the VRR is closely linked to economic fundamentals, as well as sentiment and uncertainty measures. A novel approximation method provides analytical option pricing for...
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作者：Fleckenstein, Quirin; Gopal, Manasa; Gutierrez, German; Hillenbrand, Sebastian
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Harvard University
摘要：We study the contribution of banks and nonbanks to cyclical fluctuations in the supply of syndicated loans. We find that a reduction in nonbank lending explains most of the contraction in syndicated credit and the associated employment losses during the Global Financial Crisis, while banks' contribution is small. Looking over multiple cycles, we find nonbanks' credit supply is roughly three times as cyclical as banks', suggesting that nonbanks are the main drivers of syndicated lending cycles....
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作者：Bessembinder, Hendrik; Chen, Shuaiyu; Cooper, Michael J.; Xue, Jinming; Zhang, Feng
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Virginia; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Southern Methodist University
摘要：We show that positive flows to active mutual funds with high recent returns partially reverse at longer horizons. This outcome is robust across a broad range of alternative specifications. Reversal occurs from greater outflows associated with high prior returns, not reduced inflows. We test theories to explain the reversal: investment life cycles, tax loss selling, and a behavioral disappointment hypothesis based on investors' overreaction to positive returns. While both tax loss selling and s...
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作者：Bisetti, Emilio; Lewellen, Stefan; Sarkar, Arkodipta; Zhao, Xiao
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; European Corporate Governance Institute; National University of Singapore; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：We examine whether politicians affect local firms' industrial pollution, and whether such effects are transmitted through plant-level networks to affect pollution in other regions. We first document that close Democrat wins in U.S. congressional races are associated with lower emissions and higher abatement at the plant level, especially when politicians have strong pro-environmental preferences. We also find evidence of reallocation: firms shift emissions away from areas represented by Democr...
