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作者：Gubler, Zachary
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Both theory and practice suggest that there are potentially significant gains associated with an experimental approach to lawmaking, that is to say, adopting laws on a pilot basis in order to generate empirical data that can be used to inform decisions about the optimal long-term policy. Yet, with few exceptions, those legislative entities that are best positioned to engage in experimentation administrative agencies rarely do so, probably at least in part because of interest group opposition. ...
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作者：Chabot, Christine
作者单位：Loyola University Chicago
摘要：Over thirty years ago, in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court ordered judges to defer to administrative agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Chevron's deference doctrine has since proved to be a resounding failure. The Supreme Court has applied Chevron in a highly unpredictable manner, failing to offer agencies and lower courts adequate guidance. In response, this Article compares interpretive problems arising under Chevron...
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作者：Kempson, Judson
作者单位：American University
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作者：Wansley, Matthew
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：A regulatory ageng is captured if, instead of the public interest, it pursues the interests of powerfid firms it is intended to regulate. Scholars disagree about which agencies are captured, how they become captured, and what reforms, if any, can prevent capture. There is consensus on one issue: capture is a vice. In this Article, I argue that capture can be a virtue. When powerful interest groups thwart justified regulation, the optimal strategy for pursuing that regulation may be to indirect...
