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作者：Hakelberg, Lukas; Schaub, Max
作者单位：European University Institute
摘要：Why do tax havens, whose attractiveness for foreign investors depends upon financial secrecy, agree to automatically report account data to foreign governments? From a contractualist perspective, their cooperation should be motivated by the expectation of joint gains. Prior to such agreement, however, tax havens expected outflows of foreign capital and reductions in economic activity as likely outcomes. We show that the United States (US) imposed automatic information exchange on these countri...
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作者：Jordana, Jacint; Fernandez-i-Marin, Xavier; Bianculli, Andrea C.
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; University of Munich
摘要：State structures have experienced significant transformation with the spread of globalization. This paper examines how to measure one major change that has occurred in recent decades: the worldwide proliferation of public agencies with regulatory tasks. It remains unclear how their configurations vary across countries and sectors, and what can be learned from these variations. To better identify these agencies worldwide, we introduce a new dataset on the institutional features of 799 agencies ...
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作者：Eckert, Sandra
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：Independent regulatory authorities hold comprehensive policy mandates that cover both economic and social goals. They take on various roles in market regulation, competition policy, consumer protection, and labor inspection. This article questions whether policymakers are driven by different rationales when delegating the realization of social, as opposed to economic goals, and analyzes how regulators accommodate their various roles in practice. The conceptual framework links the literature on...
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作者：Ruggie, John Gerard
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This article aims to inform the long-standing and unresolved debate between voluntary corporate social responsibility and initiatives to impose binding legal obligations on multinational enterprises. The two approaches share a common feature: neither can fully specify its own scope conditions, that is, how much of the people and planet agenda either can expect to deliver. The reason they share this feature is also the same: neither is based on a foundational political analysis of the multinati...
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作者：Apaydin, Fulya
摘要：Until recently, most empirical support for theories on regulatory governance has been derived from democratizing and democratic settings. The assumption behind the selection of these cases relies on an understanding that non-democratic systems will not nurture independent and autonomous regulatory practices. This paper closely examines this claim by problematizing variations in the regulation of the Islamic banking and finance industry based on recent findings from Malaysia and the United Arab...
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作者：Boussalis, Constantine; Feldman, Yuval; Smith, Henry E.
作者单位：Trinity College Dublin; Bar Ilan University; Harvard University
摘要：Legal directives - whether laws, regulations, or contractual provisions - can be written along a spectrum of specificity, about which behavioral and legal scholarship present conflicting views. We hypothesized that the combination of specificity and monitoring promotes compliance but harms performance and trust, whereas the combination of specificity and good faith enhances both the informative goal-setting aspects of specificity and people's sense of commitment. To test these hypotheses, we u...
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作者：Perez Duran, Ixchel
摘要：This article examines the decision to include interest group representation (IGR) in the most important decisionmaking bodies of European Union agencies (EAs). The study shows that there is considerable variation among agencies: some agencies have no IGR, others have formal rules that establish a clear distribution of the number of representatives among stakeholders, while other agencies are ambiguous with regard to the number of representatives that each group should have. In addition, intere...
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作者：Slayton, Rebecca; Clark-Ginsberg, Aaron
作者单位：Cornell University; Stanford University
摘要：Complex industries such as petroleum production, civil aviation, and nuclear power produce public risks that are widely distributed and temporally remote, and thus tend to be ignored by the risk producers. Regulation is perhaps the most common policy tool for governing such risks, but requires expert knowledge that often resides solely within the industries. Hence, many scholars and policymakers raise concerns about regulatory capture, wherein regulation serves private interests rather than th...
