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作者：Hood, Christopher
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This article reflects on the mixture of ideology, technological change, and interests that have made government instrumentalities central to the analysis of public policy over the two decades since the publication of the author's Tools of Government in 1983, and distinguishes three main strains Of analysis of policy instruments: analytic approaches that count forms of institutions as tools, analytic approaches that focus on the politics of tool selection, and generic approaches that aim to be ...
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作者：Christensen, Tom; Laegreid, Per
摘要：In this article we focus on the dynamic interplay between increase in autonomy of regulatory agencies and political control of those agencies. The general research issues are the weak empirical foundations of regulatory reforms, the complex trade-off between political control and agency autonomy, the dual process of deregulation and reregulation, the problems of role-specialization and coordination, and the questions of smart practice in regulatory policy and practice. The theoretical basis is...
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作者：Bezes, Philippe
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：The article addresses internal and hidden politics of changes in bureaucracies by focusing on the introduction and use of policy instruments as institutional change without radical or explicit shifts in administrative systems. Beneath public administrative reforms, it examines the use of low-profile instruments characterized by their technical and goal-oriented dimension but also by their low visibility to external actors due to the high complexity of their commensurating purpose and the autom...
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作者：Verhoest, Koen; Verschuere, Bram; Bouckaert, Geert
摘要：According to New Public Management (NPM) doctrines, public organizations involved in service delivery and policy implementation will be induced to innovative behavior if they have enough managerial autonomy and simultaneously are subjected to managerial pressure, such as result control by government or competition of other providers. This NPM pressure-response model is tested by using survey data on 84 Flemish public organizations. These tests provide evidence for the assumed effect of NPM-lik...
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作者：Baum, Jeeyang Rhee
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：How do civilian presidents control their bureaucracies after taking over from an authoritarian regime? To answer this question, I develop a 11 reining in theory of delegation. I argue that presidents who faces intra-branch conflict over policy issues and cannot appoint-and dismiss-freely will solve their delegation problems through administrative procedure acts (APAs) and related laws. While some scholars argue that APAs are tools for preserving the status quo, I find that APAs help presidents...
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作者：Ritchie, Bryan
作者单位：Michigan State University
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作者：Campbell, Colin
摘要：This collection addresses the issue of why it so often proves difficult to foster innovation in public management. Specifically, it focuses its attention on why reform efforts encounter so frequently intractable obstacles stemming from the erosion of the mutual regard among political executives and career officials for the integrity of each others' respective competences in the devising of policies and the crafting and implementation of decisions based upon these.
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作者：Lawson, James; Xu, Feng
作者单位：University of Victoria
摘要：China and Canada addressed the transnational 2003 SARS outbreak within a common, multilevel network of public-health expertise. The two countries deployed distinct public-health strategies, and faced distinct levels of resistance. This article addresses this comparison. During this epidemic state of exception, both countries adopted emergency policy instruments and overall policy styles. However, Chinese emergency boundary policing corresponded better to everyday experience than did hospital-b...
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作者：Erk, Jan
作者单位：Leiden University; Leiden University - Excl LUMC
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作者：Hopkin, Jonathan; Rodriguez-Pose, Andres
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This article seeks to disentangle which features of government intervention are linked to corruption and which are not, by distinguishing between the government roles of regulator, entrepreneur, and consumer. It finds that the degree of regulation of private business activity is the strongest predictor of corruption, and that high levels of public spending are related to low levels of corruption. There is no evidence of direct government involvement in production having any bearing on corrupti...
