Reining in the bureaucrats: Democratic transition and administrative procedural reform in Korea

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baum, Jeeyang Rhee
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00355.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 关键词: cabinet instability; DELEGATION

摘要

How do civilian presidents control their bureaucracies after taking over from an authoritarian regime? To answer this question, I develop a 11 reining in theory of delegation. I argue that presidents who faces intra-branch conflict over policy issues and cannot appoint-and dismiss-freely will solve their delegation problems through administrative procedure acts (APAs) and related laws. While some scholars argue that APAs are tools for preserving the status quo, I find that APAs help presidents change policy. Building on the delegation literature from economics, my theory represents a more general argument than prior theories for why presidents support APAs. I test the theory through a case study of South Korea's first civilian government (post-1961), under President Kim Young Sam. Kim initiated an APA to rein in a professionalized civil service that opposed his policy preferences. Strict procedural requirements designed to keep tabs on bureaucratic activities enhanced Kim's control over his bureaucracy.