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作者：Lockhart, Clare
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作者：Flinders, Matthew
作者单位：University of Sheffield
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作者：Kiruthu, Felix
作者单位：Kenyatta University
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作者：Vail, Mark I.
作者单位：Tulane University
摘要：This article argues that distinctive liberal traditions shaped France and Germany's Keynesian policy responses to the post-2007 economic crisis. In France, statist liberalism privileges an activist state that favors macroeconomic intervention and investment. German corporate liberalism, by contrast, is more pluralist and emphasizes the powers and responsibilities of social and economic groups, who are viewed as the fundamental components of the social order. The article argues that these tradi...
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作者：Licht, Jenny De Fine; Naurin, Daniel; Esaiasson, Peter; Gilljam, Mikael
作者单位：University of Gothenburg
摘要：We analyze the main rationale for public administrations and political institutions for supplying transparency, namely, that it generates legitimacy for these institutions. First, we discuss different theories of decision making from which plausible causal mechanisms that may drive a link between transparency and legitimacy may be derived. We find that the common notion of a straightforward positive correlation is naive and that transparency reforms are rather unpredictable phenomena. Second, ...
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作者：Weale, Albert
作者单位：University of London; University College London
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作者：Tan, Yeling
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This article examines the impact of transparency regulations enacted under authoritarian conditions, through a study of China's environmental transparency measures. Given China's decentralized administrative structure, environmental disclosure ends up being weakest in the most polluted cities. However, the measures have allowed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to affect environmental governance through unusual pathways. Multinational companies (MNCs) have used NGO pollution databases to mo...
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作者：Majumdar, Shruti
作者单位：The World Bank
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作者：Schmidt, Patrick D.
作者单位：Macalester College
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作者：Mizala, Alejandra; Schneider, Ben Ross
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Reforms designed to improve the quality of teaching by reforming personnel practices, such as pay for performance arrangements, usually run into opposition from well-organized teacher unions that can either block reform in the short run or undermine it over the longer term. The experience of a series of reforms that introduced collective and individual pay incentives for teachers in Chile from 1990 to 2010 provide a rare example of ongoing negotiation with the teacher union that resulted in an...
