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作者：Stensoeta, Helena; Waengnerud, Lena; Svensson, Richard
作者单位：University of Gothenburg
摘要：Scholars have argued that recruiting more women to office is an effective way to curb corruption; however, the more precise mechanisms underlying why this may be the case have remained unclear. We use meso-level theories to elaborate on the relationship and suggest that institutional logics mediate the effect of gendered experiences on corruption. We make two propositions: First, we suggest that the relationship between more women and lower levels of corruption is weaker in the state administr...
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作者：Jakobsen, Mads Leth Felsager; Mortensen, Peter B.
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：This article examines the impact of politics on governmental rule production. Traditionally, explanations of rule dynamics have focused on nonpolitical factors such as the self-evolvement of rules, environmental factors, and decision maker attributes. This article develops a set of hypotheses about when, why, and how political factors shape changes in the stock of rules. Furthermore, we test these hypotheses on a unique, new data set based on all Danish primary legislation and administrative r...
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作者：Coen, David; Pegram, Tom
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
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作者：Bunea, Adriana; Thomson, Robert
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Strathclyde
摘要：We examine how an executive's consultations with interest groups during the formative stage of the policy process affect its bargaining success during the decision-making stage after it has proposed new policies to legislative actors. Our theory sets out how consultations with interest groups strengthen the executive by bolstering its formal and informal agenda-setting power. The empirical testing ground for our theory is the European Union (EU), and in particular the consultations held by the...
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作者：Rothstein, Bo
作者单位：University of Gothenburg
摘要：Much research has argued for the importance of state's administrative capacity for development. Disregard for the rule of law and failure to get corruption under control are seen as detrimental to economic and social development. The China paradox refers to the fact that in all commonly used measures of levels of corruption and the quality of government, China is a country that scores quite low. China also lacks the Weberian model of bureaucracy that is seen as central for development. It is a...
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作者：Kettl, Donald F.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Brookings Institution
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作者：Lam, Wai Fung; Chan, Kwan Nok
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：The punctuated equilibrium theory contends that government attention allocation is universally leptokurtic in that long periods of stability are punctuated by bursts of rapid and radical change; the empirical evidence in support of this claim is however exclusively drawn from democratic systems. The absence of electoral politics and institutional decentralization in authoritarian regimes could presumably affect institutional friction; whether and how this might pose as a qualification to the t...
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作者：Olsen, Johan P.
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：Accountability is a principle for organizing relations between rulers and ruled, and making public officials accountable is a democratic achievement. There are, however, competing claims about what is involved in demanding, rendering, assessing, and responding to accounts; what are effective accountability institutions; and how accountability regimes emerge and change. This article provides a frame for thinking about institutional aspects of accountability regimes and their cognitive, normativ...
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作者：Ko, Kilkon
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU)
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作者：Webb, Steve
