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作者：PARKASH, M; VENABLE, CF
作者单位：California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要：The purpose of this research is to test the effects of agency incentives and knowledge spillovers in joint engagements for audit and nonaudit services. External parties and regulators have associated joint nonaudit purchases with beliefs about impaired auditor independence. Since reductions in perceived independence correspondingly reduce audit credibility, agency theory suggests that auditees have an incentive to limit nonaudit purchases because of the agency costs imposed when an audit's mon...
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作者：MUTCHLER, JF; PANY, K
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
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作者：BUCKLESS, FA; PEACE, RL
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：Auditor liability is a growing concern of public accounting firms (Collins 1985; Flynn et al. 1990; Mednick 1987; Minow 1984). In lawsuits brought by clients for breach of contract and tort actions for negligent execution of an audit, as well as in an increasing number of lawsuits brought by third parties, a common defense is the auditor's compliance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). In this study, the source of professional auditing standards was manipulated to examine its in...
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作者：FOSTER, TW; KOOGLER, PR; VICKREY, D
作者单位：Texas State University System; Texas State University San Marcos; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Downtown Phoenix
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作者：HAYES, RD; MILLAR, JA
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：THE ''extension'' of Hayes and Millar (1990) by Mensah and Li (1993) brings up essentially two areas of controversy. First, Mensah and Li find fault with our ''implied'' assumption of cross-sectionally fixed cost shares. Second, their use of an additional measure of output (AT) and an alternative measure of technology (TE) raises questions regarding model specification. In this rejoinder, we discuss these two areas of concern in order to address any previous omissions, needed clarifications, o...
