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作者：Asare, SK; McDaniel, LS
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：A review of preparers' workpapers can lead to the detection of ''classification'' errors (i.e., incorrect determinations with respect to sampled audit items) and/or ''conclusion'' errors (i.e., incorrect conclusions about populations of audited items). We examined the effects of familiarity with the preparer and task complexity on reviewers' effectiveness at detecting these errors. The results indicate that reviewers of unfamiliar preparers reperform more of the preparers' work but do not dete...
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作者：Arya, A; Glover, J
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper studies a stylized model in which a division manager's historical cost reports are verified. In a one-period setting, the problem of tacit collusion between the verifier and the division manager is so severe that no mechanism can be constructed under which there is a unique equilibrium that has the verifier exercising anything other than the minimal level of care. However, by extending the contractual relationship to two periods, the tacit collusion problem can be resolved. A featur...
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作者：Peterson, CA; Millar, JA; Rimbey, JN
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：Prior studies of stock dividends and stock splits have failed to provide valid tests of earnings signaling because they incorrectly assume that ''stock splits'' do not restrict future cash dividends. Unlike previous studies, which also incorrectly assume that cash dividends are limited only to the amount of retained earnings, we present a study based on actual accounting treatment and appropriate statutory definitions of distributable equity. We find that more positive information is signaled ...
