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作者：Lee, CWJ; Gu, ZY
作者单位：Tulane University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We construct a dynamic multi-agent moral hazard model to analyze the interactions among the firm owner, the manager and the auditor. Moral hazard may arise in hierarchical agency because a rational monitoring agent may accept a side payment from the monitored agent for misrepresenting information to the principal. This multi-agent moral hazard problem is the essence of the concern for auditor independence. We show that a low-balling compensation scheme and the auditor's legal liability constit...
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作者：Sengupta, P
作者单位：University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：This paper provides evidence that firms with high disclosure quality ratings from financial analysts enjoy a lower effective interest cost of issuing debt. This finding is consistent with the argument that a policy of timely and detailed disclosures reduces lenders' and underwriters' perception of default risk for the disclosing firm, reducing its cost of debt. The results also indicate that the relative importance of disclosures is greater in situations where there is greater market uncertain...
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作者：Summers, SL; Sweeney, JT
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：This study investigates the relationship between insider trading and fraud. We find that in the presence of fraud, insiders reduce their holdings of company stock through high levels of selling activity as measured by either the number of transactions, the number of shares sold, or the dollar amount of shares sold. Moreover, we present evidence that a cascaded logit model, incorporating insider trading variables and firm-specific financial characteristics, differentiates companies with fraud f...
