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作者：Omer, Thomas C.; Bedard, Jean C.; Falsetta, Diana
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Bentley University; University of Miami
摘要：This study investigates auditor-provided tax services from 2000 to 2002, during which fees paid to auditors for nonaudit services (NAS) were disclosed, but separate disclosure of tax service fees was voluntary. We examine changes in the market for tax NAS in 2002, as Congress debated possible prohibition of these services. Using the Heckman MLE procedure to control for selection bias in tax fee disclosure, we find that a strong pre-2002 positive association between tax fees and higher than exp...
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作者：Morsfield, Suzanne G.; Tan, Christine E. L.
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：Prior studies suggest that venture capitalists (VCs) play a monitoring role. We predict and find that IPO-year abnormal accruals are lower in the presence of VCs for a sample of 2,630 IPO firms during 1983-2001. Our findings are robust to controls for the endogenous choice of VC financing. We consistently find that the VC effect holds even when controlling for IPO lock-up provisions, VC partial cashing out subsequent to the IPO, and alternative proxies for earnings management. In addition, our...
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作者：Biddle, Gary C.; Hilary, Gilles
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This study examines how accounting quality relates to firm-level capital investment efficiency. Our first hypothesis is that higher quality accounting enhances investment efficiency by reducing information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital. Our second hypothesis is that this effect should be stronger in economies where financing is largely provided through arm's-length transactions compared with countries where creditors supply more capital. Our results are consistent...
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作者：Evans, John H., III; Kim, Kyonghee; Nagarajan, Nandu J.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：To address agents' moral hazard over effort, incentive contracts impose risk on the agents. As performance measures become noisier, the conventional agency analysis predicts that principals will reduce the incentive weights assigned to such measures. However, prior empirical results (Prendergast 2002) frequently find the opposite, i.e., incentive weights are larger (agents bear more risk) in more uncertain environments. This paper provides new evidence on the association between the extent of ...
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作者：Burgstahler, David C.; Hail, Luzi; Leuz, Christian
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper examines how capital market pressures and institutional factors shape firms' incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance. To isolate the effects of reporting incentives, we exploit the fact that, within the European Union, privately held corporations face the same accounting standards as publicly traded companies because accounting regulation is based on legal form. We focus on the level of earnings management as one dimension of accounting quality that is partic...
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作者：Frederickson, James R.; Hodge, Frank D.; Pratt, Jamie H.
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：In this study we report the results of an experiment that examines how relatively sophisticated financial statement users interpret management stock option compensation disclosures under SFAS No. 123 and SFAS No. 123R. We predict and find that mandated income statement recognition, as required under SFAS No. 123R, leads to higher user assessments of reliability than either voluntary income statement recognition or voluntary footnote disclosure, options allowed under SFAS No. 123. Users view vo...
