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作者：Thibodeau, Nicole; Evans, John H. (Harry), III; Nagarajan, Nandu J.; Whittle, Jeff
作者单位：United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Medical College of Wisconsin
摘要：As part of a federal government initiative to increase efficiency and quality, in 1996 the United States Veterans Health Administration (VHA) radically restructured its organizational design and management processes. This study uses 1992-1998 clinical, workload, and financial data to examine the effect of this reform on performance. Several previous government attempts to introduce private sector management practices, such as management by objectives (MBO) or program planning and budgeting sys...
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作者：Carter, Mary Ellen; Lynch, Luann J.; Tuna, Irem
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Virginia
摘要：We examine the role of accounting in CEO equity compensation design. For a sample of ExecuComp firms in 1995-2001, we find that financial reporting concerns are positively related to stock option use and total compensation, and negatively related to the use of restricted stock. We confirm our findings by examining changes in CEO compensation in firms that begin expensing options in 2002 or 2003. We find that these firms reduce their option use and increase their restricted stock use after star...
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作者：Han, Jun; Tan, Hun-Tong
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：In this study, we investigate underlying mechanisms for the effects of management guidance forms on investors' judgments. We do so by comparing effects of point and range guidance with those associated with a hybrid management guidance form that combines the attributes of both point and range guidance. With respect to investors' earnings reestimates made after actual earnings announcements, we find that both the number and type of benchmarks associated with the guidance forms matter. High-know...
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作者：Ray, Korok
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：It is a common practice for firms to conduct performance evaluations of their employees and yet to withhold this information from those employees. This paper argues that firms strategically withhold performance information to retain workers. In particular, if the worker enjoys high outside options and is tempted to quit, then the firm chooses not to reveal his performance information in order to keep him on the job. The firm's equilibrium strategy is to fire if performance is sufficiently low,...
