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作者：Bennett, G. Bradley; Hatfield, Richard C.
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：This study provides both survey and experimental evidence to consider how social interactions between staff-level auditors and client management may affect staff auditors' perceptions and influence their decisions regarding the collection of audit evidence. During fieldwork, staff-level auditors have extensive interaction with client management. Survey evidence suggests that these staff-level auditors are often mismatched'' with client management, in terms of their experience, age, and account...
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作者：Tafkov, Ivo D.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：This study investigates the conditions under which providing relative performance information to employees has a positive effect on performance when compensation is not tied to peer performance. Specifically, I investigate, via an experiment, the effect of relative performance information (present or absent) on performance under two compensation contracts (flat-wage or individual performance-based). Given the presence of relative performance information, I examine the effect of the type of rel...
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作者：Naiker, Vic; Sharma, Divesh S.; Sharma, Vineeta D.
作者单位：Monash University; University System of Georgia; Kennesaw State University
摘要：To address potential threats to auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the audit committee to pre-approve nonaudit services (NAS) procured from the auditor. However, the presence of a former audit firm partner (FAP) affiliated with the current auditor on the audit committee could undermine the audit committee's due diligence over the NAS pre-approval process. To alleviate such concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved a three-year cooling-off'' peri...
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作者：Kilic, Emre; Lobo, Gerald J.; Ranasinghe, Tharindra; Sivaramakrishnan, K.
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston; Singapore Management University; Rice University
摘要：We examine the impact of SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, on the reporting behavior of commercial banks and the informativeness of their financial statements. We argue that, because mandatory recognition of hedge ineffectiveness under SFAS 133 reduced banks' ability to smooth income through derivatives, banks that are more affected by SFAS 133 rely more on loan loss provisions to smooth income. We find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find ...
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作者：Banker, Rajiv D.; Darrough, Masako N.; Huang, Rong; Plehn-Dujowich, Jose M.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：This study focuses on the relation between current compensation and past performance measures as signals of a chief executive officer's (CEO's) ability. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993-2006. Consistent with the predictions, we find that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly hired CEOs. We also find...
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作者：Davidson, Bruce I.; Stevens, Douglas E.
作者单位：Old Dominion University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of Glasgow
摘要：Policy makers and corporations have recently emphasized a code of ethics as an effective aspect of corporate governance. The corporate governance literature in accounting, however, provides little empirical or theoretical support for this emphasis. We address this gap between public policy and the literature by studying the effectiveness of a code of ethics in an experimental setting. Using Bicchieri's (2006) model of social norm activation, we predict that a code of ethics will improve manage...
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作者：Naiker, Vic; Navissi, Farshid; Cameron Truong
作者单位：Monash University
摘要：This study examines how options trading affects the rate of return expected by investors, i.e., the implied cost of equity capital. Our cross-sectional analysis suggests that firms with listed options have lower implied cost of equity capital than firms without listed options, while the results from our temporal difference-in-differences analysis suggest that firms with listed options experience a significant decrease in their implied cost of equity capital relative to a matched sample of firm...
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作者：Efendi, Jap; Files, Rebecca; Ouyang, Bo; Swanson, Edward P.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Arlington; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We find that the likelihood of forced turnover in the CEO and CFO positions is significantly higher for firms in the aftermath of option backdating than in propensity-score matched control firms. Forced turnover occurs in about 36 percent of the accused firms. The forced turnover rates for CEOs and CFOs are similar and several times higher than normal. The displaced managers are further punished by the managerial labor market, as they are much less likely than control firm managers to be rehir...
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作者：Gu, Zhaoyang; Li, Zengquan; Yang, Yong George
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：Regulators and the investment community have been concerned that institutional investors pressure financial analysts through trading commission fees to issue optimistic opinions in support of their stock positions. We use a unique dataset that identifies mutual fund companies' allocation of trading commission fees to individual brokerages and provide direct evidence on this issue. In particular, we show that for stocks in which the fund companies have taken large positions, analysts are more o...
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作者：Erkens, David H.; Bonner, Sarah E.
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：Since 1999 regulators have attempted to improve the monitoring of financial reporting by exerting significant pressure on firms to appoint accounting financial experts (AFEs) to their audit committees. Yet, many firms have been reluctant to do so, which has made these firms more prone to financial reporting problems. We examine appointments of AFEs to the audit committees of S&P 1500 firms during the period 1999-2008 to explore whether concerns about the status of these experts discouraged fir...
