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作者：Yetman, Michelle H.; Yetman, Robert J.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We examine how taxes affect donations given to nonprofit organizations and how this varies across nonprofit types. Most prior studies constrained tax price elasticities to be constant across nonprofits, primarily because the data do not provide donations by nonprofit type. Using nonprofit-level data and average marginal tax rates that vary across years and states, we estimate tax price elasticities by nonprofit type. We find an aggregate public charity elasticity of approximately -1.0 and a pr...
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作者：Li, Edward Xuejun
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：Extant research on voluntary disclosure about future prospects has focused on two forward-looking disclosure mechanisms: management forecasts and conference calls. This study examines the accelerated filing of material contracts as another type of future-related disclosure that involves no forecasting. I find that firms are more likely to accelerate material contract filings when forward-looking disclosures could lack credibility or arouse litigation concerns. However, for proprietary cost con...
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作者：Chuk, Elizabeth C.
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：I examine whether firms alter their behavior in response to changes in accounting standards that mandate new financial statement disclosures. While prior research suggests that new recognition rules lead to changes in firm behavior, there is limited evidence that disclosure rules can impact firm behavior. This study helps to fill this void in the literature by examining the economic consequences of the mandated disclosures of pension asset composition required under SFAS 132R. Under pension ac...
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作者：Yetman, Michelle H.; Yetman, Robert J.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Prior research finds that donors reward nonprofits that report larger program ratios with more donations and that program ratios frequently are subject to intentional manipulation as well as unintentional errors. We examine how donors react to low-quality ratios. We find that the average donor discounts ratios that are inflated by only the simplest and most observable of methods. We then examine the effect of financial data availability on the average donor's ability to unravel inflated ratios...
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作者：Mola, Simona; Rau, P. Raghavendra; Khorana, Ajay
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper examines the value of sell-side analysts to covered firms by documenting the effects on firm performance and investor interest after a complete loss of analyst coverage for periods of at least one year. We find that analyst coverage adds value to a firm both because it reduces information asymmetries about the firm's future performance and because it maintains investor recognition for that firm's stock. After the introduction of regulations that curtailed the informational advantage...
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作者：De Simone, Lisa; Sansing, Richard C.; Seidman, Jeri K.
作者单位：Stanford University; Tilburg University; Tilburg University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This study investigates the circumstances under which enhanced relationship tax-compliance programs are mutually beneficial to taxpayers and tax authorities, as well as how these benefits are shared. We develop a model of taxpayer and tax authority behavior inside and outside of an enhanced relationship program. Our model suggests that, despite the adversarial nature of the relationship, an enhanced relationship program is mutually beneficial in many settings. The benefits are due to lower com...
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作者：Kadous, Kathryn; Leiby, Justin; Peecher, Mark E.
作者单位：Emory University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Auditors frequently seek informal advice from peers to improve judgment quality, but the conditions under which advice improves auditor judgment are poorly understood. We predict and find evidence of a trust heuristic among auditors receiving advice from advisors with whom they share a social bond. This heuristic is evident among non-specialists, who weight advice according to its justifiability when it is received from a weaker social bond advisor, but fail to objectively assess the quality o...
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作者：Cheng, Qiang; Luo, Ting; Yue, Heng
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Tsinghua University; Peking University
摘要：Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the market reaction to vague forecasts is weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we find that for management forecasts disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news forecasts are mo...
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作者：Gul, Ferdinand A.; Wu, Donghui; Yang, Zhifeng
作者单位：Monash University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We examine whether and how individual auditors affect audit outcomes using a large set of archival Chinese data. We analyze approximately 800 individual auditors and find that they exhibit significant variation in audit quality. The effects that individual auditors have on audit quality are both economically and statistically significant, and are pronounced in both large and small audit firms. We also find that the individual auditor effects on audit quality can be partially explained by audit...
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作者：Hofmann, Christian; Rothenberg, Naomi R.
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Alberta
摘要：This study investigates whether having an upstream or downstream agent privately observe an interim performance measure and disseminating this measure to the other agent is valuable to the principal. The signal is informative about the upstream agent's action and positively correlated with output. If the upstream agent privately observes the signal, then there can be a higher cost of the downstream agent if the signal is sufficiently forward-looking. If the downstream agent privately observes ...
