Revealing Future Prospects without Forecasts: The Case of Accelerating Material Contract Filings

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Edward Xuejun
• 署名单位: City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-50505
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1769-1804
• 关键词: CONFERENCE CALLS; SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION; information asymmetry; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; DISCLOSURE POLICY; earnings; management; COMPETITION; IMPACT; CONSEQUENCES

摘要

Extant research on voluntary disclosure about future prospects has focused on two forward-looking disclosure mechanisms: management forecasts and conference calls. This study examines the accelerated filing of material contracts as another type of future-related disclosure that involves no forecasting. I find that firms are more likely to accelerate material contract filings when forward-looking disclosures could lack credibility or arouse litigation concerns. However, for proprietary cost considerations, firms delay contract filings when facing high (low) product market competition from incumbents (potential entrants). I also find that accelerated contract filing is incrementally associated with lower information asymmetry. Overall, while presenting a cost-benefit trade-off that is distinctly different from forward-looking disclosures, accelerated contract filing is an important alternative channel through which firms communicate future prospects to investors.