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作者：Mayew, William J.; Sethuraman, Mani; Venkatachalam, Mohan
作者单位：Duke University; Cornell University
摘要：This paper deepens our understanding of the anatomy of an earnings conference call. Prior research indicates that, on average, analysts providing bullish stock recommendations or beatable earnings forecasts benefit from greater access to corporate management. Therefore, we analyze whether and to what extent individual analysts' ex ante stock recommendations and earnings forecasts affect the information content of analyst-manager conversations. Using intraday absolute stock price reactions arou...
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作者：Czerney, Keith; Schmidt, Jaime J.; Thompson, Anne M.; Zhu, Wei
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This study examines whether material corporate events that occur during the year-end closing process constrain management's and the auditor's resources and inhibit them from providing high-quality financial reports. For a sample of U.S. company financial reports issued during 2000-2013, we identify material corporate events using Type II subsequent event footnote disclosures (i.e., material events that occur in year t+1, but prior to the issuance of the year t financial statements, yet do not ...
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作者：Glover, Jonathan C.; Xue, Hao
作者单位：Columbia University; Duke University
摘要：Teamwork and team incentives are increasingly prevalent in modern organizations. Performance measures used to evaluate individuals' contributions to teamwork are often non-verifiable. We study a principal-multi-agent model of relational (self-enforcing) contracts in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required to pay out to the agents, and gives the principal discretion to use non-verifiable performance measures to both i...
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作者：Grabner, Isabella; Kunneke, Judith; Moers, Frank
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：While prior research on performance evaluation bias has mainly focused on the determinants and consequences of rating errors, we investigate how a firm can provide implicit incentives to supervisors to mitigate these errors via its calibration committee. We empirically examine the extent to which a calibration committee incorporates supervisors' evaluation behavior with respect to their subordinates in the performance evaluation outcomes, i.e., performance ratings and promotion decisions, for ...
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作者：Ege, Matthew S.; Kim, Young Hoon; Wang, Dechun
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; George Mason University
摘要：Brand name audit firms are global networks of local audit firms. These networks claim to enforce consistent audit methodologies across their member firms, which, if true, should systematically affect client financial reporting. We find that clients from different countries have more (less) comparable accruals when they are audited by local audit firms from the same global network (different global networks). Furthermore, inferences are similar when we examine client accrual comparability aroun...
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作者：Hiemann, Moritz
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：To explain the empirically documented nonlinear, non-monotonic relationship between earnings and firm value, it suffices to assume that firms continually take profit-maximizing decisions in response to newly arriving investment opportunities. The real options embedded in these opportunities create hysteresis effects that lead to the well-known, but so far poorly understood, negative earnings-to-value relation among loss-making firms. Optionality also predicts the future growth component of fir...
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作者：Van der Stede, Wim A.; Wu, Anne; Wu, Steve Yu-Ching
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; National Chengchi University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We examine how employees respond to bonuses and penalties using a proprietary dataset from an electronic chip manufacturer in China. First, we examine the relative effects of bonuses and penalties and observe a stronger effect on subsequent effort and performance for penalties than for bonuses. Second, we find that the marginal sensitivity of penalties diminishes faster than that of bonuses, indicating that the marginal effect of a bonus may eventually exceed that of a penalty as their value i...
