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作者：Drake, Michael S.; Moon Jr, James R.; Warren, James D.
作者单位：Brigham Young University; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
摘要：We employ a novel machine learning technique to classify analysts' forecast revisions into five types based on how the revision weighs publicly available signals. We label these forecast types as quant, sundry, contrarian, herder, and independent forecasts. Our tests reveal that a greater diversity of forecast types within the consensus is associated with increased consensus dispersion and improved consensus accuracy. Additionally, consensus diversity is associated with an improved information...
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作者：McClure, Charles G.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I develop a structural model to quantify the costs of tax avoidance. In the model, the firm trades off tax savings with tax audit risk, financial reporting considerations, and operational frictions imposed by tax avoidance, the last of which I label as nontax costs. The estimated parameters suggest nontax costs, which are difficult to observe, decrease pretax income by 6.4 percent or $58 million per firm-year. The large magnitude of this estimate can explain why firms appear to underutilize ta...
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作者：Brown, Nerissa C.; Huffman, Adrienna A.; Cohen, Shira
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; The Brattle Group; California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要：We examine whether the complexity of mandatory accounting disclosures prompts managers to voluntarily disclose adjusted measures of actual earnings performance, and whether this practice reflects attempts to obfuscate or mitigate the informational opacity accounting complexity creates for investors. Using the metadata in XBRL filings, we construct measures of accounting complexity that map directly to the mandated standards applied in financial statement filings. We find a positive and economi...
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作者：Lyle, Matthew R.; Riedl, Edward J.; Siano, Federico
作者单位：Emory University; Boston University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper examines how changes in risk disclosures affect uncertainty about risk. We measure changes in risk disclosures using the addition and removal of individual risk factors to firms' 10-K filings, identified via textual analysis of the risk factors section. Our market outcome is the variance risk premium (VRP), which captures the market's pricing of uncertainty about firm risk. Following recent theoretical predictions, we predict and empirically document that newly disclosed signals of ...
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作者：Garza, Brent A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
摘要：I examine inspector-auditor interactions and test proposed changes to the existing inspection process using a stylized experiment with real-effort and repeated interactions. I first show that when holding incentives constant, if inspectors perceive incentives to request additional audit work, they escalate their deficiency assessments and request more additional audit work. I then show that increasing inspector-auditor discussions before inspectors formally assess auditors' work tempers those ...
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作者：Bertomeu, Jeremy; Hu, Peicong (Keri); Liu, Yibin
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
摘要：Investors have a finite capacity to organize all information they receive from financial disclosures. Under rational inattention, we show that investor processing capacity affects the probability of disclosure. Our main result is that the likelihood of disclosure is inverse-U shaped in investor attention. For low levels of attention, more attention facilitates communication and increases disclosure; for high levels of attention, more attention better identifies, and therefore deters, unfavorab...
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作者：Yehuda, Nir; Armstrong, Christopher S.; Cohen, Daniel; Zhou, Xiaolu
作者单位：University of Delaware; Stanford University; Vanderbilt University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We examine how firms' contractual relationships with their employees affect the design of their debt contracts, and the use of financial covenants in particular. Viewing the firm as the nexus of both explicit and implicit contractual relationships, we argue that managers cater to their employees' preferences when negotiating contractual terms with creditors. We argue that an increase in unemployment-insurance benefits reduces employees' cost of job loss, which, in turn, allows managers to take...
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作者：Packard, Heidi A.; Pawliczek, Andrea; Skinner, A. Nicole
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：This paper examines voluntary disclosure in the context of shareholder scrutiny of executive compensation contracts. We find that firms voluntarily increase discussion of their performance within their CD&A disclosures when peer-benchmarked compensation relative to performance is high. In contrast, we do not find a similar increase in performance discussion in the corresponding MD&A disclosures, which suggests that the effect is not driven by firms' general disclosure practices. We also find t...
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作者：Narayanamoorthy, Gans; Page, John; Song, Bohan
作者单位：Tulane University; University of Alberta
摘要：Insurance pricing is subject to stricter regulation in some states than others. This cross-sectional variation, coupled with the occurrence of staggered deregulation in several states, enables a powerful test of the political cost hypothesis that managers manipulate accruals to mitigate adverse effects of rate regulation. We show that insurers understate their loss reserve accruals in more regulated regimes, a finding that contrasts with most prior studies documenting expense-increasing accrua...
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作者：Muller, Maximilian A.; Peter, Caspar David; Urzua, I. Francisco
作者单位：University of Cologne; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; City St Georges, University of London
摘要：We study whether firms avoid financial disclosures to preserve their owners' financial privacy. We find that firms named after their owner, for whom firm disclosure would more directly expose owner information, are more opaque. Eponymous owners prefer firm opacity when disclosure exposes sensitive owner information with social stigma, in rural and anticapitalist areas, and in insider-oriented settings with high secrecy and distrust. When firms are forced to disclose, eponymous owners more freq...
