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作者：Kubick, Thomas R.; Li, Yijun
作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：We identify executives who have experienced significant accounting-related adverse events during their careers as a powerful setting to examine the extent to which prior professional experience can influence subsequent financial reporting policies. We find that firms led by senior financial executives who have experienced accounting-related adverse events during their careers exhibit greater unconditional accounting conservatism, a lower likelihood of experiencing future accounting-related adv...
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作者：Ecker, Frank; Francis, Jennifer; Olsson, Per; Schipper, Katherine
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Duke University
摘要：For a broad sample of firms, we use structural equations modeling to construct latent variables for realaction aggressiveness and reporting policy aggressiveness. We estimate the association between the latent variables and the associations of each latent variable with shareholder payoffs (returns) and CEO payoffs (annual compensation to the CEO position). Results show the two types of aggressiveness are positively correlated but have different associations with the payoffs we consider. Greate...
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作者：Kanodia, Chandra; Venugopalan, Raghu
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Houston Downtown
摘要：Corporate managers often express concern about accounting-induced volatility in financial statements. Accounting regulators, however, argue that the volatility in financial statements merely increases transparency by shining a light on risks that are inherent to the firm's business. We show that in many situations managerial concerns about volatility are justified because the information that is being provided actually magnifies rather than merely reflects the volatility in a firm's fundamenta...
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作者：Kim, Tae Wook; Li, Jing; Pae, Suil
作者单位：Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：A firm manager is concerned about both the firm value and the market assessments of his abilities. When investing in a project, he has private knowledge of his project-related ability that interacts with the project investment, and his general ability that produces a cash flow independent of the project cash flow. The concerns about the general (project-related) ability assessment create a signaling incentive to decrease (increase) investment. In the presence of underinvestment (overinvestment...
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作者：Garza, Brent A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
摘要：I examine inspector-auditor interactions and test proposed changes to the existing inspection process using a stylized experiment with real-effort and repeated interactions. I first show that when holding incentives constant, if inspectors perceive incentives to request additional audit work, they escalate their deficiency assessments and request more additional audit work. I then show that increasing inspector-auditor discussions before inspectors formally assess auditors' work tempers those ...
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作者：Chan, Derek K.; Liu, Nanqin
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Southern University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study the effects of the disclosure of critical audit matters (CAMs) on an auditor's audit effort and an investor's scrutiny effort decisions and on investment efficiency. Both the auditor and the investor can prevent a bad investment by respectively auditing and scrutinizing the firm's financial reports to detect misstatements about the investment value. Investment efficiency is determined by the investor's total mix of information. The disclosure of CAMs helps the investor assess investme...
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作者：Kim, Eunhee; Pae, Suil
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：This paper presents a costly voluntary disclosure model in which the information quality of a signal about a firm's future cash flow is unknown, where the information quality, also called signal quality, refers to signal precision. Disclosure plays a dual role in firm valuation, providing information about both the cash flow and signal quality. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which the firm price under disclosure is a nonmonotonic and bounded function of the signal. Unde...
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作者：Bertomeu, Jeremy; Hu, Peicong (Keri); Liu, Yibin
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
摘要：Investors have a finite capacity to organize all information they receive from financial disclosures. Under rational inattention, we show that investor processing capacity affects the probability of disclosure. Our main result is that the likelihood of disclosure is inverse-U shaped in investor attention. For low levels of attention, more attention facilitates communication and increases disclosure; for high levels of attention, more attention better identifies, and therefore deters, unfavorab...
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作者：Chen, Ciao-Wei; Correia, Maria; Urcan, Oktay
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We examine the real effects of lease-capitalization rules (i.e., standards that require firms to capitalize finance leases) on corporate investment. We show that the introduction of these rules leads to a decrease in investment, which is more pronounced for firms with high reliance on leases. We posit and find that lease capitalization affects investment via a learning channel and a contracting channel. Regarding the first channel, we argue that managers identify areas of overinvestment and ac...
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作者：Jackson, Scott B.; Salzsieder, Leigh; Schaefer, Tammie J.
作者单位：University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Kansas City
摘要：Evidence reveals that managers exercise discretion over budget estimates, but little is known about whether revenues or expenses are more susceptible to budget discretion. Drawing upon regulatory focus theory, we predict a pattern of budget discretion that has not previously been identified. To test our theory, we conduct a series of experiments where managers face a goal to either minimize the performance metric to avoid missing the target (minimal budget goal) or maximize the performance met...
