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作者：Ege, Matthew S.; Kim, Young Hoon; Wang, Dechun
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; George Mason University
摘要：Using a comprehensive database of U.S. internal auditor job postings, we find that firms are about 10 percent more likely to post an internal auditor job after the revelation of accounting and operational failures. Also, the demand for internal auditors is stronger when a failure is more severe. Among firms posting internal auditor jobs, firms demand higher-quality internal auditors in response to a failure compared with when there has not been a recent failure. We find evidence of internal au...
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作者：Brown, Nerissa C.; Huffman, Adrienna A.; Cohen, Shira
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; The Brattle Group; California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要：We examine whether the complexity of mandatory accounting disclosures prompts managers to voluntarily disclose adjusted measures of actual earnings performance, and whether this practice reflects attempts to obfuscate or mitigate the informational opacity accounting complexity creates for investors. Using the metadata in XBRL filings, we construct measures of accounting complexity that map directly to the mandated standards applied in financial statement filings. We find a positive and economi...
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作者：Easton, Peter D.; Larocque, Stephannie A.; Mason, Paul; Utke, Steven
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Baylor University; University of Connecticut
摘要：We describe variation in the reporting quality (i.e., accuracy and bias of reported net asset values (NAVs)) of private equity (PE) funds across types of external monitors (investors and auditors) and third-party service providers (valuation specialists, marketers, and administrators). In contrast to public markets, we find only limited evidence that reporting quality varies with the composition and types of investors in PE funds. We observe, however, that reporting quality varies with auditor...
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作者：Glaeser, Stephen; Schonberger, Bryce; Wasley, Charles E.; Xiao, Jason J.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Rochester
摘要：There is limited evidence about when, why, and which individuals incur costs to acquire nonpublic information about a firm, largely due to the difficulty of observing private information acquisition. To overcome this difficulty, we obtain data on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We predict and find that perceived information asymmetry between managers and outsiders resulting from both proprietary and agency costs triggers FOI...
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作者：Jaggi, Jacob
作者单位：Washington State University
摘要：I examine whether audit committees (ACs) improve financial reporting reliability by utilizing an internal audit function (IAF) as a resource and use semistructured interviews with chief audit executives and AC chairs to develop an understanding of the nature of AC-IAF relations. Using AC charters, I measure AC interaction with IAFs, finding improvement in financial reporting reliability for firms that introduce a new IAF under a New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) mandate. This improvement is limit...
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作者：Blackburne, Terrence P.; Quinn, Phillip J.
作者单位：Oregon State University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We examine cross-sectional variation in disclosure speed by using data that allow us to measure when managers learn of SEC investigations and the time lag until subsequent disclosures. We document that external monitoring and litigation risk are associated with 99 percent and 39 percent faster disclosure, and managerial entrenchment with 28 percent slower disclosure. When revelations by external parties preempt managers' disclosures, we observe a significant increase in bid-ask spreads that pe...
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作者：Koo, Minjae; Sivaramakrishnan, Konduru; Zhao, Yuping
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Rice University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：Fair value estimates from external third-party sources are generally considered more reliable than internal estimates based on managerial inputs. However, even externally sourced estimates are subject to managerial opportunism, because firms can switch from one external source to another. In the context of life insurance companies that mostly rely on external sources, we posit that such source switches could be driven by managerial incentive either to faithfully report fair values (objective v...
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作者：Lyle, Matthew R.; Riedl, Edward J.; Siano, Federico
作者单位：Emory University; Boston University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper examines how changes in risk disclosures affect uncertainty about risk. We measure changes in risk disclosures using the addition and removal of individual risk factors to firms' 10-K filings, identified via textual analysis of the risk factors section. Our market outcome is the variance risk premium (VRP), which captures the market's pricing of uncertainty about firm risk. Following recent theoretical predictions, we predict and empirically document that newly disclosed signals of ...
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作者：Bushee, Brian J.; Taylor, Daniel J.; Zhu, Christina
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Although the shareholder benefits of investor conferences are well-documented, evidence on whether these conferences facilitate managerial opportunism is scarce. We examine whether managers opportunistically exploit heightened attention around the conference to hype the stock. We find that (1) managers increase the quantity of voluntary disclosure leading up to the conference, (2) these disclosures are more positive in tone and increase prices to a greater extent than post-conference disclosur...
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作者：Gallani, Susanna
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Can managers use monetary incentives to elicit cooperation from workers they cannot reward for their efforts? I study conduit incentives, an innovative incentive design, whereby managers influence bonus -ineligible workers' effort by offering bonus -eligible employees a monetary reward for performance that critically depends on the cooperation of the bonus-ineligible workers. Motivated by the reward, bonus-eligible employees use social motivators to elicit cooperation from their ineligible col...
