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作者：Kim, Sunyoung; Park, Jongwon
作者单位：Monash University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：This study examines the performance target response to CEO overconfidence. Using unique hand- collected data on the annual bonus targets of Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms, we find that boards ratchet targets more aggressively and apply greater ratcheting asymmetry for overconfident CEOs than for non-overconfident CEOs. These findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. We also provide evidence that the increase in target ratcheting for overconfident CEOs is particularly more pron...
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作者：Christensen, Brant E.; Cline, Brandon N.; Lundstrom, Nathan G.; Yore, Adam S.
作者单位：Brigham Young University; Mississippi State University; University of Kansas; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：We study off-the-clock indiscretion accusations against corporate officers and directors and examine the extent, effectiveness, and context of auditors' response. In the year that indiscretion allegations are first publicized, auditors charge higher fees and are more likely to resign. Auditors respond to allegations against both top executives and board members. Further, reactions are strongest when allegations demonstrate a lack of individual integrity and, separately, when the audit office h...
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作者：Albuquerque, Ana; Albuquerque, Rui; Carter, Mary Ellen; Dong, Qi (Flora)
作者单位：Boston University; Boston College; Boston College; University System of Georgia; Kennesaw State University
摘要：We estimate the pay premium associated with CEO incentive compensation. Using explicit detailed U.S. CEO compensation contract data and simulation analysis, we find that CEOs with riskier pay packages receive a premium for pay at risk that represents 13.5 percent of total pay. The premium is positively correlated with proxies for CEO risk aversion, but implied risk aversion values suggest that the premium is economically smaller than suggested by prior studies. We perform our tests using a var...
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作者：Gomez, Enrique A.; Heflin, Frank; Moon Jr, James R.; Warren, James D.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
摘要：Less-informed investors face greater costs of processing earnings news into actionable information. Our findings suggest financial analysis on social media reduces less-informed investors' disclosure processing costs. We document an attenuated spike in earnings announcement (EA) information asymmetry for quarters containing more financial analysis on social media in the weeks prior to the EA. Cross-sectional evidence suggests this finding is stronger when coverage from traditional intermediari...
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作者：Lennox, Clive; Wu, Xi
作者单位：Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important way for non-Big 4 accounting firms to grow their businesses. Non-Big 4 firms also account for the vast majority of PCAOB inspections. Consistent with negative inspection reports signaling low quality at inspected firms, we find that non-Big 4 accounting firms conduct fewer M&A deals after they receive negative inspection reports. Additional analyses support our hypothesized signaling mechanism: (1) the chilling effect of inspection reports on M&...
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作者：Chang, Yen-Cheng; Tseng, Kevin; Yu, Tzu-Wen
作者单位：National Taiwan University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：Access to firms' innovation outputs determines the extent of knowledge spillover that poses risk to innovation appropriability. We provide plausibly causal evidence that processing costs of financial disclosures, which inform users of the economic value of innovation, play a key role in firms' management of knowledge spillover. We exploit an exogenous, randomly assigned, and staggered policy shock by the SEC that reduces processing costs of mandatory financial disclosures. In response, firms r...
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作者：Bai, John (Jianqiu); Chen, Ting; Martin, Xiumin; Wan, Chi
作者单位：Northeastern University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Boston; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We employ a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effects of investor-base disclosure (IB DISCLOSE) on funding outcomes and entrepreneurship success. Since February 2016, Kickstarter has disclosed IB information, namely, backer statistics including geographic locations and previous funding experience of the backers, once the number of backers for a project reaches ten. Exploiting this discontinuity, we show the disclosure increases the likelihood of funding success by 10...
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作者：Jung, Sumi
作者单位：Yonsei University
摘要：This paper investigates whether and how firms receiving benefits through their connections to politicians use accounting discretion to mitigate the costs associated with negative publicity. I utilize a unique setting that captures the change in political costs arising from chairmanship appointments to influential U.S. Senate committees. Firms in the home state of a promoted officeholder often receive preferential treatment, drawing public scrutiny and incentivizing them to avoid reporting extr...
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作者：Li, Edward Xuejun; Neamtiu, Monica; Tu, Zhiyuan
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：We study firms' decisions to withhold loan covenant details by focusing on a unique disclosure-related cost. Prior research documents the prevalence of tight initial covenants that are selectively relaxed in future renegotiations. This uncertainty in renegotiation outcomes can generate a disclosure-related cost because disclosing a snapshot of initial covenants with a high likelihood of violation could lead to harmful outsider reactions (e.g., trade credit cuts) to violations that may be event...
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作者：Aghamolla, Cyrus; Guttman, Ilan; Petrov, Evgeny
作者单位：Rice University; New York University; University of Zurich
摘要：Firms with correlated fundamentals often issue reports sequentially, leading to information spillovers. The theoretical literature has investigated multifirm reporting, but only when firms report simultaneously. We examine the implications of sequential reporting, where firms aim to maximize their market price and can manipulate their reports. The introduction of sequentiality significantly alters the biasing behavior of firms and the resulting informational environment relative to simultaneou...
