-
作者：McVay, Sarah; Nagar, Venky; Tang, Vicki Wei
作者单位：New York University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Georgetown University
摘要：We examine stock sales as a managerial incentive to help explain the discontinuity around the analyst forecast benchmark. We find that the likelihood of just meeting versus just missing the analyst forecast is strongly associated with subsequent managerial stock sales. Moreover, we provide evidence that managers manage earnings prior to just meeting the threshold and selling their shares. Finally, the relation between just meeting and subsequently selling shares does not hold for non-manager i...
-
作者：Hilary, Gilles
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Prior results from the labor relations literature suggest that revealing information weakens management's position in collective bargaining. Thus, when facing organized labor, management has an incentive to preserve the information asymmetry with outsiders. This study uses a sample from a large cross-section of the economy over several years to test this relation. Results are consistent with this prediction. Strong organized labor is associated with higher bid-ask spreads, higher probability o...
-
作者：Aboody, David; Barth, Mary E.; Kasznik, Ron
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University
摘要：Focusing on the four key option pricing model inputs-expected option life, expected stock price volatility, expected dividend yield, and the risk-free interest rate for the expected life of the option-this study finds that firms understate option value estimates and, thus, stock-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123. As predicted based on incentives and opportunities for management to understate SFAS 123 expense, the understatement of option value estimates is increasing in proxi...
-
作者：Francis, Jere R.; Ke, Bin
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We investigate if the SEC's recently mandated disclosure of fees for audit and nonaudit services paid by firms to their incumbent auditors affected the market's perception of auditor independence and earnings quality. Following the initial fee disclosures in 2001, we find that the market valuation of quarterly earnings surprises (earnings response coefficient) was significantly lower for firms with high levels of nonaudit fees than for firms with low levels of such fees. In contrast, in the ye...
-
作者：Davila, Antonio; Penalva, Fernando
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Stanford University
摘要：We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO's compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we...
-
作者：Marques, Ana
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：This paper examines the effect of two Securities and Exchange Commission regulatory interventions related to disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures. There are three main results. First, the probability of disclosure of non-GAAP earnings declines in 2003, but the probability of disclosure of other non-GAAP financial measures has an accelerated decline after the first intervention. Second, all else equal, after Regulation G, investors have a positive market reaction to the disclosure of non-G...
