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作者：Ramalingegowda, Santhosh
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：A key assumption in many accounting and finance studies is that long horizon institutional investors are informed shareholders. Yet past empirical research finds no evidence that these institutions anticipate major corporate events, including earnings-based events. I find that long horizon institutions are better informed in that they sell more shares of impending bankrupt firms than of matched distress firms at least one quarter ahead of bankruptcy. Share sales are greater in impending bankru...
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作者：You, Haifeng
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper investigates whether the desire to achieve higher equity valuations induces conglomerates to manipulate their segment earnings. I extend the Stein (Q J Econ 104:655-669, 1989) model to a multi-segment setting and show that conglomerates have incentives to transfer profits from segments operating in industries with lower valuation multiples to those with higher multiples, even if the market is not fooled in equilibrium. If companies engage in such manipulation, segments with relative...
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作者：Bhimani, Alnoor; Gulamhussen, Mohamed Azzim; Lopes, Samuel da Rocha
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Instituto Universitario de Lisboa
摘要：We examine the effects of owner liability and non-accounting and financial accounting information on the probability of default as defined in Basel II in bank loan contracted by non listed firms. We model default as a function of owner liability and accounting and non-accounting information of non-listed firms, drawing on 43,117 annual accounts of 16,029 firms over a 7-year period. Our estimations based on mixed logistic regressions with random parameters show that the predicted default probab...
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作者：Huang, Rong; Marquardt, Carol A.; Zhang, Bo
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Renmin University of China
摘要：Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt-equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity...
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作者：Yin, Huifang; Zhang, Huai
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We argue that financial analysts can be viewed as participants of two tournaments (the All-Star tournament and the intrafirm tournament) and examine whether analysts are incentivized by the tournament compensation structure. Using data from 1991 to 2007, we find that interim losers are more likely to increase the boldness of their forecasts in the remainder of the tournament period than interim winners. This finding survives several robustness checks and is more pronounced when the interim ass...
