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作者：Billings, Mary Brooke; Cedergren, Matthew C.; Dube, Svenja
作者单位：New York University; Santa Clara University; Fordham University
摘要：Research suggests that earnings-disclosure-related litigation causes managers to reduce subsequent disclosure, perhaps stemming from a belief that even their good faith disclosures will cause them trouble. This paper considers unexplored dimensions of disclosure and alternative channels of disclosure to provide additional evidence that speaks to how litigation shapes managers' disclosure strategies. Consistent with Skinner (1994)'s classic legal liability hypothesis, we find that, while manage...
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作者：Christensen, Theodore E.; Gomez, Enrique; Ma, Matthew; Pan, Jing
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University; Southern Methodist University
摘要：We examine how exogenous changes in analyst coverage influence (1) thelikelihoodthat managers will voluntarily disclose customized (non-GAAP) performance metrics and (2) the relativequalityof their non-GAAP disclosures. Specifically, we use a quasi-natural-experimental setting in which brokerage firms terminate analyst coverage and find that, following an unanticipated decrease in analyst coverage, managers are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings per share (EPS) numbers. We also find tha...
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作者：Kent, Richard; Birt, Jacqueline
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Western Australia
摘要：We identify and predict circumstances where the direct method statement of cash flows is expected to provide more value relevant information to financial statement users. We predict the direct method is more informative when earnings are of lower quality (earnings are less permanent or companies report losses), companies are in a more stable state (proxied by small absolute changes in accruals/operating cash flow), and when cash flows/accruals are measured with more error using the indirect me...
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作者：Even-Tov, Omri; Ozel, Naim Bugra
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Using monthly and multi-day return windows, research shows that credit rating downgrades often reveal new information and lead to significant stock price reactions but that upgrades do not. Using intraday data, we revisit these findings and extend them by examining the possibility of informed trading ahead of the announcement of credit rating changes. Credit rating agencies delay public announcements of rating changes to provide issuers with time to review and respond to rating reports, which ...
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作者：Chen, Ting; Levy, Hagit; Martin, Xiumin; Shalev, Ron
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Boston; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Washington University (WUSTL); University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University Toronto Scarborough
摘要：This study investigates the role personal connections play in a crucial element of the supply chain-supplier selection. We find that the likelihood that a potential supplier (hereafter, a vendor) is selected to be an actual supplier (hereafter, supplier) increases when personal connections between executives of the vendor and the customer exist. The magnitude of the effect varies predictably across management ranks and positions and is stronger when information asymmetries between a vendor and...
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作者：Curtis, Asher; Li, Valerie; Patrick, Paige H.
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; California State University System; San Diego State University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：We document widespread adoption of adjustments to earnings for performance evaluation; 84% of our sample of S&P 1500 firms use adjusted earnings for bonus compensation. We find that the transactions removed from adjusted earnings vary widely and include both transitory and nontransitory items. We examine the determinants of using adjusted earnings and find some evidence that boards are more likely to contract using adjusted earnings when firms have high levels of intangible assets, more volati...
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作者：Honigsberg, Colleen; Katz, Sharon P.; Mutlu, Sunay; Sadka, Gil
作者单位：Stanford University; INSEAD Business School; University System of Georgia; Kennesaw State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper examines the relation between state contract law and the use of accounting information in debt contracts. Contract theory suggests that balance sheet based covenants resolve debtholder-shareholder conflicts ex ante, whereas income statement based covenants serve as trip- wires that trigger the switch of control rights ex post. It is more difficult for lenders to exert their control rights ex post if the contract law is more favorable to debtors (i.e., the law is pro-debtor), suggest...
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作者：Kim, Jung Min; Taylor, Daniel J.; Verrecchia, Robert E.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
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作者：Dai, Lili; Shen, Rui; Zhang, Bohui
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：We examine the effect of media coverage on firm innovation. Using a comprehensive sample of corporate news coverage and patenting over the period from 2000 to 2012, we find a negative relation between media coverage and firm innovation. We further document the two offsetting economic mechanisms underlying the impact of media coverage on innovation: the media's role of short-term pressure on managers relates negatively to innovation, while its role of mitigating financial constraints is positiv...
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作者：Raghunandan, Aneesh
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I examine the relation between firms' financial conduct and wage theft. Wage theft represents the single largest form of theft committed in the United States and primarily affects firms' most vulnerable employees. I show that wage theft is more prevalent (i) when firms just meet or beat earnings targets and (ii) when executives' personal liability for wage theft decreases. Wage theft precedes financial misconduct while the theft is undetected, but once firms are caught engaging in wage theft t...
