The use of adjusted earnings in performance evaluation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Curtis, Asher; Li, Valerie; Patrick, Paige H.
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; California State University System; San Diego State University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09580-1
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1290-1322
• 关键词: pro forma; institutional investors; corporate governance; street earnings; BONUS SCHEMES; moral hazard; COMPENSATION; POWER; GAAP; Informativeness

摘要

We document widespread adoption of adjustments to earnings for performance evaluation; 84% of our sample of S&P 1500 firms use adjusted earnings for bonus compensation. We find that the transactions removed from adjusted earnings vary widely and include both transitory and nontransitory items. We examine the determinants of using adjusted earnings and find some evidence that boards are more likely to contract using adjusted earnings when firms have high levels of intangible assets, more volatile earnings, CEOs with shorter tenures, CEOs who also act as board chairperson, or larger compensation committees or are reporting losses. We find that firms with an independent chairperson or lead director are less likely to contract using adjusted earnings. We examine the compensation consequences of the use of adjusted earnings and find that CEOs compensated on adjusted earnings are less likely to miss minimum bonus thresholds, are less likely to meet maximum bonus thresholds, and have higher overall bonus compensation, controlling for firm performance. Taken together, our analyses suggest that both managerial power and efficient contracting concerns explain the use of adjusted earnings in CEO compensation contracts.