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作者:Demere, Paul
作者单位:University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要:I examine whether tax return information is useful to equity investors. I do so indirectly, by exploiting unique features of the syndicated loan market, as evidence shows that lenders obtain tax returns from borrowers and that lenders' private information is transmitted to equity markets when institutional investors are part of a loan syndicate. I find significant increases in tax expense valuation and decreases in tax-related market anomalies following the issuance of institutional syndicated...
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作者:Welch, Kyle; Yoon, Aaron
作者单位:George Washington University; Northwestern University
摘要:Firm managers are facing increasing external pressure to allocate firm resources to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) efforts. Given that ESG activities are frequently perceived as in opposition to shareholder value, however, managers may find it difficult to decide which projects they should select and how much they should invest. Using MSCI ESG Ratings and Glassdoor employee ratings of senior managers as signals for firm ESG efforts and high managerial ability, we find evidence tha...
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作者:Baginski, Stephen P.; Campbell, John L.; Ryu, Patrick W.; Warren, James D.
作者单位:University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Manchester; University of Connecticut
摘要:The vast majority of managers' earnings forecasts are issued concurrently (i.e., bundled) with their firm's current earnings announcement. We document a predictable bias in these forecasts-the forecasts fail to fully reflect the persistence of the current earnings surprise. Specifically, we find that managers issue (1) optimistically biased forecasts alongside negative earnings surprises and (2) pessimistically biased forecasts alongside large positive earnings surprises. Bayesian updating imp...
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作者:Kim, Jung Min
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania
摘要:I examine the relation between investors' uncertainty about managerial horizon and corporate voluntary disclosure. I argue that investors' uncertainty about the manager's short-term stock price concern works as a disclosure friction that allows for a partial disclosure equilibrium. When investors are uncertain about managers' horizons, short-horizon managers can withhold bad news by pooling with long-horizon managers who are not motivated to disclose, regardless of the content of the news, as ...
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作者:Hu, Jinshuai; Li, Siqi; Shevlin, Terry
作者单位:Xiamen University; Santa Clara University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要:Income taxes are a major expense for profitable corporations, often totaling 25% or more of pretax income. This study exploits the market for corporate control to test competing agency-based and risk-based explanations of corporate tax planning. Exploiting the staggered enactment of M&A laws across countries that increased the threat of takeover as an exogenous shock that allows a powerful difference-indifferences design, we find a significant reduction in tax avoidance following the takeover ...
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作者:Dai, Xin; Gao, Feng; Lisic, Ling Lei; Zhang, Ivy Xiying
作者单位:Drexel University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要:This paper examines the impact of a firm's social performance on the CEO's employment prospects. We find that CEOs are more (less) likely to leave office when there is a significant recent decline (improvement) in social performance. We then track departing CEOs' subsequent employment records and find that the social performance of their previous employers improves their labor market outcomes. These CEOs are more likely to find a new executive position, move up to a larger public firm, and rec...
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作者:Chen, Jun; Li, Ningzhong; Zhou, Xiaolu
作者单位:Zhejiang University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要:We provide new causal evidence for the impact of equity financing incentive on firms' voluntary disclosure decisions by exploring the 2008 seasoned equity offering deregulation, which exogenously facilitates small firms' access to public equity financing and increases their equity issuance incentives without changing their business and information environments. We argue that the heightened equity financing incentive due to the deregulation can motivate a firm to increase disclosures even in th...
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作者:Caskey, Judson; Huang, Kanyuan; Saavedra, Daniel
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要:We use required 8-K filings around major borrowings to shed light on firms' choices of whether to comply with SEC disclosure rules. Exploiting within-firm variation, we find that firms are more likely to hide loans with high spreads and tight financial covenants. We further find that firms appear to exploit the ambiguity of the definition of materiality, as they are more likely to selectively disclose (hide) immaterial loans when interest rates are low (high). Firms are less likely to hide loa...
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作者:Bourveau, Thomas; Chen, Jason, V; Elfers, Ferdinand; Pierk, Jochen
作者单位:Columbia University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要:We examine whether higher accounting comparability between public and private firms leads to higher value relevance of private firms' reported financial information. To help develop our hypotheses, we conduct a series of interviews with M&A valuation experts. The experts indicate that comparable accounting between public and private firms allows them to apply public firms' valuation multiples directly to private firms, which facilitates the use of private firms' financial reporting in their va...
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作者:Reineke, Rebecca; Weiskirchner-Merten, Katrin; Wielenberg, Stefan
作者单位:Leibniz University Hannover; Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要:This study examines how a strategic tax auditor affects a multinational firm's transfer pricing in a tax compliance game. Our model uses a divisionalized firm, in both a low-tax and a high-tax country, that decides to implement a transfer-pricing regime with either one or two sets of books. After observing its unit costs, the firm reports a compliant or noncompliant tax transfer price. In a regime with one set of books, the single transfer price coordinates the quantity decision and determines...