Noncompliance with SEC regulations: evidence from timely loan disclosures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Caskey, Judson; Huang, Kanyuan; Saavedra, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09638-0
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 126-163
• 关键词: Information asymmetry; determinants; QUALITY; covenants; CHOICE; IMPACT; size; cost

摘要

We use required 8-K filings around major borrowings to shed light on firms' choices of whether to comply with SEC disclosure rules. Exploiting within-firm variation, we find that firms are more likely to hide loans with high spreads and tight financial covenants. We further find that firms appear to exploit the ambiguity of the definition of materiality, as they are more likely to selectively disclose (hide) immaterial loans when interest rates are low (high). Firms are less likely to hide loans when investors anticipate borrowing during asset acquisition, when firms are followed by more equity analysts or receive more investor attention, and when the firms' stock prices are more volatile. Lastly, we provide evidence that the SEC does not rigorously enforce compliance with 8-K loan disclosures.