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作者：Shaffer, Matthew
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：This paper provides an overview of valuation multiples in mergers and acquisitions advisory. I review the literature and legal controversies and the theoretical basis for their role. I then standardize all the advisor multiples available in SDC Platinum along four dimensions and report rich descriptive statistics on each dimension over time and across industries. I highlight eight findings that are notable in light of current knowledge and debates. This paper answers the call from Gow et al. (...
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作者：Lilge, Alexandra; Ramchandani, Abhishek
作者单位：Leibniz University Hannover; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
摘要：Should employers disclose their assessments of their employees? Popular managerial advice suggests that telling employees that they are assessed to have high potential leads to greater effort and engagement, boosting firm profits. However, some employers still choose to withhold employee assessments. What explains this paradoxical observation? We show that disclosing a positive assessment to an employee increases his incentive to appear successful. Success can be achieved by working hard or by...
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作者：Choi, Ahrum; Kim, Jeong-Bon; Lee, Jay Junghun; Park, Jong Chool
作者单位：Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); City University of Hong Kong; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Boston; State University System of Florida; University of South Florida
摘要：We investigate whether and how the market for corporate control affects the demand for audit service in a cross-country setting. In so doing, we exploit the staggered enactments of merger and acquisition (M&A) laws as an exogenous shock that substantially increases takeover pressure. We find that firms are more likely to choose Big 4 auditors in the period after the enactment of M&A laws, suggesting that the takeover pressure heightened by the passage of M&A laws increases the demand for audit...
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作者：Armstrong, Christopher S.; Heinle, Mirko S.; Luneva, Irina
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Standard Bayesians' beliefs converge when they receive the same piece of new information. However, when agents initially disagree and have uncertainty about the precision of a signal, their disagreement might instead increase, despite receiving the same information. We demonstrate that this divergence of beliefs leads to a unimodal effect of the absolute surprise in the signal on trading volume. We show that this prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence using trading volume around ...
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作者：Liu, Zheng; Zhang, Ning
作者单位：Hong Kong Baptist University; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We examine the effect of digital financial reporting on firm productivity. Information frictions represent a constraint that impedes efficient resource allocation and a major source of such frictions stems from the fact that firms' production functions (the conversion from inputs to outputs) are not observable to corporate outsiders. Digital communication of corporate financial data fundamentally changes how firm-specific information is disclosed, released, and disseminated by mitigating infor...
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作者：Amiram, Dan; Owens, Edward
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：We investigate an unexplored channel-loss given default (LGD)-through which accounting information can shape the design of debt contracts. Using a sample of defaulted bonds, we find that borrower accounting information available at contract initiation possesses significant power for predicting realized LGD at the subsequent default date. We then use this model to construct an accounting-based measure of expected LGD at the contracting date for a large sample of bond issuances. We find that thi...
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作者：Chen, Hui; Pfeiffer, Thomas
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Vienna
摘要：We study a publicly traded firm that cares about its short-term stock market performance while collaborating with a privately owned firm in a business alliance. The firms each undertake a relation-specific investment and then bargain over the allocation of the joint surplus generated by the alliance. The public firm's myopic market concerns affect both the total size of the surplus and how the firms divide the surplus. While the public firm always becomes more aggressive and obtains more of th...
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作者：Canace, Thomas; Li, Jiao; Ma, Tao
作者单位：Wake Forest University; Nova Southeastern University; Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University
摘要：Exploiting an exogenous decrease in analyst access to private information, we show that firms with analyst following (test firms) experience a significant reduction in R&D investment, relative to firms without analyst following (control firms), after Reg FD. We also document that the negative impact on firms ' R&D investment after Reg FD is borne out in firms' innovation outputs measured by patents. Additional analysis reveals that the decrease in R&D investment concentrates among test firms f...
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作者：Bourveau, Thomas; Brendel, Janja; Schoenfeld, Jordan
作者单位：Columbia University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：Decentralized finance (DeFi) has emerged to offer traditional financial services such as lending, borrowing, and trading without intermediaries (e.g., banks). DeFi transactions are typically executed using a special digital class of contracts called smart contracts. These contracts are self-executing and hard-coded directly on a blockchain. We observe the emergence of a new class of voluntary audits that evaluate the integrity of these contracts. Using a hand-coded sample of about 8,500 smart ...
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作者：Kim, Seil; Oh, Seungjoon
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Peking University; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen)
摘要：Using a novel dataset of US companies' regular board meeting schedules, we find evidence of informed trading by outside directors prior to board meetings. During the days prior to board meetings, when outside directors possess private information, they make more profitable and larger purchases than they do during other periods. We find no such patterns among inside directors who possess private information regardless of the timing of board meetings. We further find that the profitability of ou...
