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作者：Kanodia, C
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
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作者：Baldenius, T; Reichelstein, S
作者单位：Columbia University; Stanford University
摘要：Multidivisional firms frequently rely on external market prices in order to value internal transactions across profit centers. This paper examines market-based transfer pricing when an upstream division has monopoly power in selling a proprietary component both to a downstream division within the same firm and to external customers. When internal transfers are valued at the prevailing market price, the resulting transactions are distorted by double marginalization. The imposition of intracompa...
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作者：Doyle, Jefrey T.; Lundholm, Russell J.; Soliman, Mark T.
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Stanford University
摘要：We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time-series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our ...
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作者：Ball, R; Shivakumar, L
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We investigate the role of accrual accounting in the asymmetrically timely recognition (incorporation in reported earnings) of gains and losses. Timely recognition requires accruals when it precedes complete realization of the gains and losses in cash. We show that nonlinear accruals models incorporating the asymmetry in gain and loss recognition (timelier loss recognition, or conditional conservatism) offer a substantial specification improvement, explaining substantially more variation in ac...
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作者：Guedhami, Omrane; Pittman, Jeffrey A.
作者单位：Memorial University Newfoundland; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries. Accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration, since the expropriation of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. After controlling for other country-lev...
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作者：Ke, Bim; Yu, Yong
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on for...
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作者：Wang, DC
作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：This study investigates the relation between founding family ownership and earnings quality using data from the Standard & Poor's 500 companies. Existing literature has documented that financial reporting is of higher quality when firms have stronger corporate governance mechanisms and when there is greater demand for quality financial reporting. I provide two competing theories of the effect of founding family ownership on the demand and supply of earnings quality: the entrenchment effect and...
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作者：Rajan, MV; Reichelstein, S
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Key indicators of managerial performance are frequently subjective, that is, they are difficult to specify and/or verify for contracting purposes. When a principal must rely on subjective information to create incentives for a group of agents, discretionary bonus pools are shown to be optimal mechanisms. Despite their optimality, however, discretionary bonus pools entail an additional agency cost relative to the benchmark of optimal contracts based on objective and verifiable information. Our ...
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作者：Erickson, M; Hanlon, M; Maydew, EL
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996-2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud. We measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests. We find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud. These results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock-based compensation and the...
