Is there a link between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Erickson, M; Hanlon, M; Maydew, EL
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00194.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 113-143
• 关键词: stock option awards; corporate governance; earnings management; COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; performance; grants; firm

摘要

We compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996-2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud. We measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests. We find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud. These results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock-based compensation and the resulting equity holdings increase the likelihood of accounting fraud.