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作者：Francis, Jennifer; Nanda, Dhanajay; Olsson, Per
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We investigate the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital. We find that firms with good earnings quality have more expansive voluntary disclosures (as proxied by a self-constructed index of coded items found in 677 firms' annual reports and 10-K filings in fiscal 2001) than firms with poor earnings quality. In unconditional tests, we find that more voluntary disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital. However, consistent with the complementary as...
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作者：Libby, Robert; Hunton, James E.; Tan, Hun-Tong; Seybert, Nicholas
作者单位：Cornell University; Maastricht University; Bentley University; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We examine whether analysts' incentives to maintain good relationships with management contribute to the optimistic/pessimistic within-period time trend in analysts' forecasts. In our experiments, 81 experienced sell-side analysts from two brokerage firms predict earnings based on historical information and management guidance. Analysts' forecasts exhibit an optimistic/pessimistic pattern across the two timing conditions (early and late in the quarter), and the effect is significantly stronger...
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作者：Lafond, Ryan; Roychowdhury, Sugata
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In this paper we examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism. Separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems between managers and shareholders. Financial reporting conservatism is one potential mechanism to address these agency problems. We hypothesize that, as managerial ownership declines, the severity of agency problem increases, increasing the demand for conservatism. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that conservatism as measured...
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作者：Laux, Volker
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper analyzes how board independence affects the CEO's ability to extract rents from the firm. The CEO is assumed to possess private information about his ability, which the board needs in order to decide whether to replace him. If the board is more active in removing low quality CEOs, the incumbent is better able to use his information advantage to extract rents. Since the board cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract, a board that is fully independent from the CEO is more active ...
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作者：Eberhart, Allan; Maxwell, William; Siddique, Akhtar
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Arizona
摘要：Many previous studies document a positive relation between research and development (R&D) and equity value. Though R&D can increase equity value by increasing firm value, it can also increase equity value at the expense of bondholder wealth through an increase in firm risk because equity is analogous to a call option on the underlying firm value. Shi [2003] tests this hypothesis by examining the relation between a firm's R&D intensity and its bond ratings and risk premiums at issuance. His res...
