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作者：Dey, Aiyesha
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I investigate whether corporate governance is associated with the level of agency conflicts in firms. I employ exploratory principal components analysis on 22 individual governance variables to obtain seven factors that represent the different dimensions of governance for a firm. I measure the level of agency conflicts in firms based on seven proxies for agency conflicts used in the literature. I find that firms with greater agency conflicts have better governance mechanisms in place, particul...
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作者：Rogers, Jonathan L.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This study examines whether managers strategically alter disclosure quality in response to personal incentives, specifically those derived from trading on their own account. Using changes in market liquidity to proxy for disclosure quality, I find that trading incentives are associated with disclosure quality choices. Tests are performed across three disclosure samples: management forecasts, conference calls, and press releases. Consistent with a desire to reduce the probability of litigation,...
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作者：Daske, Holger; Hail, Luzi; Leuz, Christian; Verdi, Rodrigo
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) reporting around the world. We analyze the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital, and Tobin's q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms' cost of capital and an increase in equity valuations, but only if we a...
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作者：Bergman, Nittai K.; Roychowdhury, Sugata
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper investigates how firms react strategically to investor sentiment via their disclosure policies in an attempt to influence the sentiment-induced biases in expectations. Proxying for sentiment using the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index, we show that during low-sentiment periods, managers increase forecasts to walk up current estimates of future earnings over long horizons. In contrast, during periods of high sentiment, managers reduce their long-horizon forecasting activity. Further...
