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作者：Ball, Ray
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Not surprisingly, the recent accounting scandals look different when viewed from the perspectives of the political/regulatory process and of the market for corporate governance and financial reporting. We do not have the opportunity to observe a world in which either market or political/regulatory processes operate independently, and the events are recent and not well researched, so untangling their separate effects is somewhat conjectural. This paper offers conjectures on issues such as: What...
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作者：Gao, Feng; Wu, Joanna Shuang; Zimmerman, Jerold
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：This paper provides evidence about the unintended consequences arising when small companies are exempted from costly regulations-these firms have incentives to stay small. Between 2003 and 2008, the SEC postponed compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) for non-accelerated filers (firms with public float less than $75 million). We hypothesize and find that some of these firms had an incentive to remain below this bright line threshold. Moreover, we document that thes...
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作者：Holthausen, Robert W.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
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作者：Stulz, Rene M.
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：As barriers to international investment fall and technology improves, the cost advantages for a firm's securities to trade publicly in the country in which that firm is located and for that country to have a market for publicly traded securities distinct from the capital markets of other countries will progressively disappear. Securities laws remain an important determinant of whether and where securities are issued, how they are valued, who owns them, and where they trade. I show that there i...
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作者：Kho, Bong-Chan; Stulz, Rene M.; Warnock, Francis E.
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (1) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the direct effect of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the indirect effect) in response to the governance and (2)...
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作者：Coates, John C.
作者单位：Harvard University
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作者：Hochberg, Yael V.; Sapienza, Paola; Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We evaluate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders in order to affect the final implemented rules under SOX. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation. Such firms appear to be characteri...
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作者：Zingales, Luigi
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The U.S. system of securities law was designed more than 70 years ago to regain investors' trust after a major financial crisis. Today we face a similar problem. But while in the 1930s the prevailing perception was that investors had been defrauded by offerings of dubious quality securities, in the new millennium, investors' perception is that they have been defrauded by managers who are not accountable to anyone. For this reason, I propose a series of reforms that center around corporate gove...
