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作者:Clor-Proell, Shana M.; Maines, Laureen A.
作者单位:Texas Christian University; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要:We investigate whether recognition on the face of the financial statements versus disclosure in the footnotes influences the amount that financial managers report for a contingent liability. Using an experiment with corporate controllers and chief financial officers, we find that financial managers in public companies expend more cognitive effort and exhibit less strategic bias under recognition than disclosure. This difference appears to be associated with capital market pressures experienced...
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作者:Lee, Edward; Strong, Norman; Zhu, Zhenmei (Judy)
作者单位:University of Manchester; Fudan University
摘要:Between 2000 and 2003 a series of disclosure and analyst regulations curbing abusive financial reporting and analyst behavior were enacted to strengthen the information environment of U.S. capital markets. We investigate whether these regulations reduced security mispricing and increased stock market efficiency. After the regulations, we find a significant reduction in short-term stock price continuation following analyst forecast revisions and earnings announcements. The effect was more prono...
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作者:Chen, Qi; Huang, Zeqiong; Zhang, Yun
作者单位:Duke University; George Washington University
摘要:This paper analyzes the effects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short-horizon investors with different levels of private information precision. We first show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of private information revealed by price in equilibrium (i.e., price informativeness) and can lead to multiple linear equilibria. We then demonstrate that the presence of both information asymmetry and short horizons provides a ...
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作者:Rebello, Michael; Wei, Kelsey D.
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要:We examine proprietary research produced by buy-side analysts working for a large fund management company. We find that the buy-side research has investment value for a one-year horizon, and the analysts producing this research exhibit differential ability that tends to persist over time. The buy-side research strongly influences trades made by the company's funds, especially when it coveys information that is independent of the fund managers' own information, when it is produced by buy-side a...
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作者:Chen, Jeff Zeyun; Shane, Philip B.
作者单位:University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; William & Mary
摘要:This paper decomposes the cash component of earnings and analyzes persistence characteristics and pricing implications of various subcomponents, with particular attention to changes in cash. Changes in underlying fundamentals might dictate changes in cash to new optimal levels. Alternatively, suboptimal changes in cash might result from agency costs allowing managers' actions to diverge from the best interests of shareholders. We predict and find that both suboptimal increases and decreases in...
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作者:Flor, Christian Riis; Frimor, Hans; Munk, Claus
作者单位:University of Southern Denmark; Aarhus University; Copenhagen Business School
摘要:We derive the optimal compensation contract in a principal-agent setting in which outcome is used to provide incentives for both effort and risky investments. To motivate investment, optimal compensation entails rewards for high as well as low outcomes, and it is increasing at the mean outcome to motivate effort. If rewarding low outcomes is infeasible, compensation consisting of stocks and options is a near-efficient means of overcoming the manager's induced aversion to undertaking risky inve...