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作者：Ball, Ray; Li, Xi; Shivakumar, Lakshmanan
作者单位：University of Chicago; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We outline several properties of IFRS that potentially affect the contractibility or the transparency of financial statement information, and hence the use of that information in debt contracts. Those properties include the increased choice among accounting rules IFRS gives to managers, enhanced rule-making uncertainty, and increased emphasis on fair value accounting. Consistent with reduced contractibility of IFRS financial statement information, we find a significant reduction in accounting-...
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作者：Park, Hyungshin; Vrettos, Dimitris
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：We offer evidence that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEOs' incentive contracts influences the effect of risk-taking incentives on both the magnitude and composition of firm risk. We find that, when the incentive design lacks RPE features, the incentive portfolio vega motivates CEOs to increase total risk through the systematic component because it can be hedged. In contrast, when the incentive design includes RPE features, CEOs prefer idiosyncratic risk because RPE filter...
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作者：Chen, Shuping; Miao, Bin; Shevlin, Terry
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; National University of Singapore; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We construct a new, parsimonious, measure of disclosure quality-disaggregation quality (DQ)-and offer validation tests. DQ captures the level of disaggregation of accounting data through a count of nonmissing Compustat line items, and reflects the extent of details in firms' annual reports. Conceptually, DQ differs from existing disclosure measures in that it captures the fineness of data and is based on a comprehensive set of accounting line items in annual reports. Unlike existing measures, ...
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作者：Bertomeu, Jeremy; Cheynel, Edwige
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Columbia University
摘要：How should a firm measure a productive asset used as collateral? To answer this question, we develop a model in which firms borrow funds subject to collateral constraints. We characterize the qualities of optimal asset measurements and analyze their interactions with financing needs, collateral constraints, and interest rates. Because of real effects, complete transparency would reduce contracting efficiency and, hence, the measurement must be suitably adapted to credit conditions. The optimal...
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作者：Cardinaels, Eddy; Yin, Huaxiang
作者单位：KU Leuven; Tilburg University; Nanjing Tech University
摘要：Principals make decisions on various issues, ranging from contract design to control system implementation. Few studies examine the principal's active role in these decisions. We experimentally investigate this role by studying how a principal's choice of an incentive contract that may discourage misrepresentation, compared to a fixed-salary contract, affects the honesty of his or her agents' cost reporting. Results show that, besides an incentive effect and a principal trust effect, the activ...
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作者：Willenborg, Michael; Wu, Biyu; Yang, Yanhua Sunny
作者单位：University of Connecticut; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：We study the relation between issuer operating performance and initial public offering (IPO) price formation from the initial price range to the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day. For a post-bubble sample of 2001-2013 IPOs, we find that pre-IPO net income and, in particular, operating cash flow are strongly, positively associated with the revision from the mid-point of the initial price range to the offer price and that the partial adjustment phenomenon concentrates amo...
