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作者：Bhaskar, Lori Shefchik; Hopkins, Patrick E.; Schroeder, Joseph H.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：The majority of U.S. public companies release annual earnings prior to the completion of audit fieldwork. We investigate this phenomenon in a controlled experiment with audit partners and senior managers. We find that releasing earnings before completion of the audit pressures auditors to adopt the goals of management, thereby reducing the likelihood of post-announcement audit-adjustment recommendations. We also examine the effect of audit committee (AC) strength in improving auditors' judgmen...
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作者：Huang, Allen; Hui, Kai Wai; Li, Reeyarn Zhiyang
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Hong Kong; University of Mannheim
摘要：Drawing on the political theory of judicial decision making, our paper proposes a new and parsimonious ex ante litigation risk measure: federal judge ideology. We find that judge ideology complements existing measures of litigation risk based on industry membership and firm characteristics. Firms in liberal circuits (the third quartile in ideology) are 33.5% more likely to be sued in securities class action lawsuits than those in conservative circuits (the first quartile in ideology). This res...
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作者：Roychowdhury, Sugata; Srinivasan, Suraj
作者单位：Boston College; Harvard University
摘要：Gatekeepers in financial markets have the power to provide the institutional stability, fortitude, and direction necessary for the development and the smooth functioning of capital markets. At the same time, they are often motivated by their own private incentives. This along with the tradeoffs they face, and the at-times unintended consequences of the regulations they propose and enforce, can undermine their effectiveness. A thorough understanding of gatekeepers and their roles can thus illum...
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作者：Lee, Kyungha (Kari); Schantl, Stefan F.
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper studies firms' financial reporting incentives in the presence of strategic credit rating agencies and how these incentives are affected by the level of competition in the rating industry and by rating agencies' role as gatekeepers to debt markets. We develop a model featuring an entrepreneur who seeks project financing from a perfectly competitive debt market. After publicly disclosing a financial report, the entrepreneur can purchase credit ratings from rating agencies that strateg...
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作者：Law, Kelvin K. F.; Mills, Lillian F.
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We examine whether financial advisors with pre-advisor criminal records pose a greater risk to investors than those without. We find that financial advisors with pre-advisor criminal records are more likely to receive future customer complaints. Their complaints are more likely to receive arbitration awards or settlements and are more likely to involve large settlements exceeding $100,000. Finally, clients are more likely to suffer service disruptions from engaging advisors with pre-advisor cr...
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作者：Beatty, Anne; Gillette, Jacquelyn; Petacchi, Reining; Weber, Joseph
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Georgetown University
摘要：We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the re...
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作者：Chen, Ciao-Wei
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This study examines whether requiring the disclosure of audited financial statements disciplines managers' mergers and acquisitions (M&As) decisions. When an M&A transaction meets certain disclosure thresholds, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires the public acquirer to disclose the target's audited financial statements after the merger is completed. Using hand-collected data, I find that the disclosure of private targets' financial statements is associated with better acquisi...
