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作者：Lee, Kyungha (Kari); Schantl, Stefan F.
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper studies firms' financial reporting incentives in the presence of strategic credit rating agencies and how these incentives are affected by the level of competition in the rating industry and by rating agencies' role as gatekeepers to debt markets. We develop a model featuring an entrepreneur who seeks project financing from a perfectly competitive debt market. After publicly disclosing a financial report, the entrepreneur can purchase credit ratings from rating agencies that strateg...
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作者：Banker, Rajiv D.; Darrough, Masako; Li, Shaopeng; Threinen, Lucas
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Macalester College
摘要：We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent's risk aversion, two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem. However, the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately dec...
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作者：Blankespoor, Elizabeth; Dehaan, Ed; Wertz, John; Zhu, Christina
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We investigate the frictions that impede individual investors' use of accounting information and, in particular, their costs of monitoring and acquiring accounting disclosures. We do so using an archival setting in which individuals are presented with automated media articles that report both current earnings news and past stock returns. Although these investors have earnings information readily available, we find no evidence that their trades incorporate it. Instead we find that their trading...
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作者：Bradshaw, Mark T.; Huang, Alan G.; Tan, Hongping
作者单位：Boston College; University of Waterloo; McGill University
摘要：Prior research demonstrates that a strong institutional infrastructure in a country moderates self-serving behavior of market participants. Cross-country economic activities have increased significantly, presenting a research opportunity to examine the relative influence of local versus foreign institutional infrastructure on individual market participants. We utilize variation in analyst-country location relative to covered firm location to examine institutional determinants of optimism in an...
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作者：He, Xianjie; Yin, Huifang; Zeng, Yachang; Zhang, Huai; Zhao, Hailong
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Nanyang Technological University; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：We use a large pictorial sample of Chinese financial analysts to test the association between facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) and performance in men. Financial analysts offer an ideal setting for our investigation because we can objectively track individual analysts' behaviors and performance. We find that high-fWHR analysts are more likely to conduct corporate site visits and they exhibit better performance. The positive fWHR-performance association survives a battery of robustness checks...
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作者：Law, Kelvin K. F.; Mills, Lillian F.
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We examine whether financial advisors with pre-advisor criminal records pose a greater risk to investors than those without. We find that financial advisors with pre-advisor criminal records are more likely to receive future customer complaints. Their complaints are more likely to receive arbitration awards or settlements and are more likely to involve large settlements exceeding $100,000. Finally, clients are more likely to suffer service disruptions from engaging advisors with pre-advisor cr...
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作者：Beatty, Anne; Gillette, Jacquelyn; Petacchi, Reining; Weber, Joseph
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Georgetown University
摘要：We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the re...
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作者：Chen, Ciao-Wei
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This study examines whether requiring the disclosure of audited financial statements disciplines managers' mergers and acquisitions (M&As) decisions. When an M&A transaction meets certain disclosure thresholds, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires the public acquirer to disclose the target's audited financial statements after the merger is completed. Using hand-collected data, I find that the disclosure of private targets' financial statements is associated with better acquisi...
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作者：Costello, Anna M.; Granja, Joao; Weber, Joseph
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are more likely to enforce restatements of banks' call reports. Further, we find that the effect of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset ...
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作者：Cascino, Stefano; Correia, Maria; Tamayo, Ane
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study how the interplay of disclosure and regulation shapes capital allocation in reward crowdfunding. Using data from Kickstarter, the largest online reward crowdfunding platform, we show that, even in the absence of clear regulation and enforcement mechanisms, disclosure helps entrepreneurs access capital for their projects and bolsters engagement with potential project backers, consistent with the notion that disclosure mitigates moral hazard. We further document that, subsequent to a ch...
