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作者：Chen, Yangyang; Ng, Jeffrey; Yang, Xin
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We examine how options trading affects voluntary corporate disclosure, so that we can shed light on whether managers' potential learning from the options market induces them to withhold disclosure. We find that options trading reduces the likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts, suggesting that firms that have active options trading on their stock make fewer voluntary disclosures. This finding is in accordance with the theoretical prediction that managers strategically reduce...
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作者：Dey, Aiyesha; Heese, Jonas; Perez-Cavazos, Gerardo
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We study the effect of financial incentives on whistleblowing and the consequences for whistleblowers under the cash-for-information program of the False Claims Act (FCA). Exploiting appeals-court decisions that increase financial incentives for whistleblowing, we find that greater incentives increase the number of lawsuits filed with the regulator, the regulator's investigation length, the percentage of intervened lawsuits, and the percentage of settled lawsuits. Using information from lawsui...
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作者：Doxey, Marcus M.; Lawson, James G.; Lopez, Thomas J.; Swanquist, Quinn T.
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; Bucknell University
摘要：In early 2017, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) mandated the disclosure of audit participants, including the lead audit partner and other audit firms participating in the audit (component auditors). In this study, we examine whether investors use these disclosures in a way that influences their investment decisions, a primary goal of the PCAOB. Using trading volume, absolute abnormal returns, and bid-ask spreads, we find little evidence of a significant investor response f...
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作者：Bertomeu, Jeremy; Cheynel, Edwige; Cianciaruso, Davide
摘要：Does managing the production of information add value in economic environments where a manager may claim to be uninformed and withhold unfavorable news? We examine this question by nesting an optimal persuasion mechanism, controlling how evidence is organized, within a voluntary disclosure framework. Information has productive consequences because the firm uses it to make a continuous operating decision. The optimal reporting strategy features coarse information at the most unfavorable reporte...
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作者：Dekeyser, Simon; Gaeremynck, Ann; Knechel, W. Robert; Willekens, Marleen
作者单位：KU Leuven; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University of Auckland; University of New South Wales Sydney; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：Competition in audit markets is an important topic but direct tests of market competition have been limited. In this paper, we examine how audit firms behave when they are confronted with competition from another firm in a wide range of industry segments in a local market. Sharing a large number of market segments can lead to mutual forbearance among audit rivals. Such mutual forbearance is likely to manifest as higher audit fees in a market because rivals are hesitant to aggressively compete ...
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作者：Cardinaels, Eddy; Feichter, Christoph
作者单位：Tilburg University; KU Leuven; Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：Many firms use forced rating systems in which supervisors must evaluate employees according to a predefined distribution. We develop new theory suggesting that forced ratings are less likely to enhance performance when supervisors assess subjective dimensions of employee performance (e.g., creativity), but can have some harmful side effects. In a laboratory experiment, employees work on a creative task, and supervisors rate their performance. We do not find any difference in the employees' per...
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作者：Kaplan, Zachary; Martin, Xiumin; Xie, Yifang
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of British Columbia
摘要：Consensus estimates, formed by taking an average of analyst forecasts, play an important role in capital markets (e.g., provide investors with a proxy for earnings expectations). We show I/B/E/S, a prominent information intermediary, removes 6% of one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts before calculating the consensus, and among the 23% of firm-quarters with at least one forecast removed, this figure rises to 16%. We provide evidence suggesting that I/B/E/S subjectively applies policies that gov...
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作者：Dube, Svenja; Zhu, Chenqi
作者单位：Fordham University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We examine how firms respond to the increased workplace transparency due to the coverage on Glassdoor.com, which collects and disseminates reviews on employee satisfaction. Leveraging the staggered timing of first-time reviews on Glassdoor, we use a difference-in-differences design and find that after being reviewed on Glassdoor, firms improve their workplace practices, measured by corporate social responsibility scores on employee relations and diversity. Consistent with firms improving their...
